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Abandoning the Federal Role in 
Education: The Every Student Succeeds 
Act 
Derek W. Black* 
In December 2015, Congress passed the Every Student Succeeds 
Act (ESSA), which redefined the role of the federal government in 
education. The ESSA attempted to appease popular sentiment against 
the No Child Left Behind Act’s (NCLB) overreliance on standardized 
testing and punitive sanctions. But in overturning those aspects of the 
NCLB, Congress failed to devise a system that was any better. 
Congress simply stripped the federal government of regulatory power 
and vastly expanded state discretion. For the first time in fifty years, 
the federal government lacks the ability to prompt improvements in 
student achievement and to demand equal resources for low-income 
students. Thus, the ESSA boldly presumes that states will voluntarily 
improve educational opportunities for low-income students despite 
their historical tendency to do the contrary. 
This Article is the first to offer a comprehensive analysis and 
critique of the ESSA. It demonstrates that although the ESSA commits 
to equality on its face, it does the opposite in practice. First, the ESSA 
affords states wide latitude on student performance, accountability, 
and school reform. Broad state discretion opens the door to fifty 
disparate state systems, none of which ensure equality. Second, the 
ESSA directly weakens two existing equity standards and ignores a 
loophole that exempts 80 percent of school expenditures from equity 
analysis. Third, the ESSA leaves federal funding flat, eliminating the 
possibility that additional resources will offset the inequalities that the 
foregoing provisions permit. These changes to federal education law 
are so out of character that they beg the question of why the federal 
government is even involved in education. 
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Although Congress is unlikely to repeal the ESSA, the Act is set 
to expire by its own terms in an unusually short time period. Thus, 
preparations to either reauthorize or alter the Act will start soon. By 
then, the inequalities that the ESSA permits will be evident. This Article 
proposes that Congress cure the ESSA’s flaws by increasing the 
federal investment in education to: (1) create the leverage needed for 
states to accept federal prohibitions on unequal funding practices; (2) 
meet the outstanding needs of low-income students; and (3) expand 
preschool education, which would close achievement gaps and, 
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For half of a century, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act has 
defined the federal role in public education. Through substantial statutory 
revisions and periodic reauthorizations,1 Congress has consistently expanded the 
federal role with an aim toward improving low-income students’ academic 
achievement and ensuring equal access to resources.2 On the day the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act became law in 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson 
remarked, “[N]o law I have signed or will ever sign means more to the future of 
America.”3 He believed it would “bridge the gap between helplessness and hope 
for more than five million educationally deprived children.”4 
On December 10, 2015, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
underwent drastic changes. Congress reauthorized the Act under the popularly 
titled bill, the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA).5 To the delight of states and 
                                                 
 1. For both constitutional and practical reasons, spending legislation must be revisited and 
reauthorized periodically. See generally Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 
(1988); see also ANDREA BOYLE & KATELYN LEE, TITLE I AT 50: A RETROSPECTIVE 3 (2015) (charting 
prior reauthorizations of the Education Act); James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child 
Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 937 (2004) (discussing the periodic reauthorization of the 
Education Act and its more recent iterations). Notable reauthorizations in recent decades include the 
Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, and now the Every 
Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 
6301 et seq.). 
 2. See generally Derek W. Black, The Congressional Failure to Enforce Equal Protection 
Through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 313, 336–40 (2010) (discussing 
the history of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act); Phyllis McClure, The History of 
Educational Comparability in Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, in CTR. 
FOR AM. PROGRESS, ENSURING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN PUBLIC EDUCATION: HOW LOCAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT FUNDING PRACTICES HURT DISADVANTAGED STUDENTS AND WHAT FEDERAL POLICY CAN 
DO ABOUT IT 9, 13 (2008). 
 3. Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States, Remarks on Signing the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Bill (Apr. 11, 1965), http://www.lbjlibrary.org/lyndon-baines-
johnson/timeline/johnsons-remarks-on-signing-the-elementary-and-secondary-education-act 
[https://perma.cc/3W6K-93ZS]. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015). 
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school districts, the ESSA eliminated the punitive testing and accountability 
measures of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB).6 But in the fervor to end the 
NCLB, few stopped to seriously consider the wisdom of what replaced it.7 The 
new Act, the ESSA, moves education in a direction that was unthinkable just a 
few short years ago: no definite equity provisions, no demands for specific 
student achievement, and no enforcement mechanism to prompt states to 
consistently pursue equity or achievement. 
The ESSA reverses the federal role in education and returns nearly full 
discretion to the states.8 Although state discretion in some contexts can ensure 
an appropriate balance of state and federal power,9 state discretion on issues of 
educational equality for disadvantaged students has proven particularly corrosive 
in the past. Most prominently, states and local districts vigorously resisted school 
integration for at least two decades following Brown v. Board of Education.10 In 
fact, this very resistance made the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 
1965 necessary.11 State resistance to equality, however, extends well beyond 
                                                 
 6. See, e.g., NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, WHY EDUCATORS SUPPORT THE EVERY STUDENT 
SUCCEEDS ACT (S. 1177) (2015) (urging teachers to support ESSA as a means of ending NCLB’s flaws); 
NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, NSBA HAILS NEW EDUCATION LAW AS HISTORIC WIN FOR RESTORING 
LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC EDUCATION (2015) (applauding “lawmakers for restoring local 
governance and working with our public education stakeholders to end the prescriptive requirements 
under the No Child Left Behind Act”); Andrew Spitser, Note, School Reconstitution Under No Child 
Left Behind: Why School Officials Should Think Twice, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1339, 1364 (2007) (discussing 
the negative effects of NCLB sanctions). As one astute observer noted, “What most conservatives seem 
to be rejoicing about the Every Student Succeeds Act is that it’s replacing Obama’s waiver system.” 
Alia Wong, The Bloated Rhetoric of No Child Left Behind’s Demise, ATLANTIC (Dec. 9, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/12/the-bloated-rhetoric-of-no-child-left-behinds-
demise/419688 [https://perma.cc/2WHX-8J5H]. 
 7. Gary Orfield, A Great Federal Retreat: The 2015 Every Student Succeeds Act, 3 EDUC. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 273, 284 (2016) (“The result was a legislative process in which all consideration came 
down not to a great debate in the House and Senate, but instead a ‘take it or leave it’ proposition that 
was enacted within days.”). 
 8. Alyson Klein, ESSA Architect Q&A: Sen. Lamar Alexander, R-Tenn., EDUC. WK. (June 13, 
2016, 8:40 AM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-
12/2016/06/essa_architect_q_a_sen_lamar_a.html [https://perma.cc/95T2-7KZT] (quoting Senator 
Alexander as saying, “the law is the most significant devolution of power to the states in a quarter 
century, certainly on education”); Orfield, supra note 7, at 276–77. 
 9. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (discussing the benefits of our 
federal structure); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for 
a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–10 (1988) (same). 
 10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 
430 (1968); Montgomery v. Starkville Sch. Dist., No. 1:83-CV-00293-MPM (N.D. Miss. Mar. 3, 2016) 
(desegregation order for the Starkville-Oktibbeha Consolidated School District in Mississippi). 
 11. Neal Devins & James B. Stedman, New Federalism in Education: The Meaning of the 
Chicago School Desegregation Cases, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1243, 1246 (1984) (“The primary 
purpose of [the Elementary and Secondary Education Act] was no longer to help schools do better what 
they were already doing; rather, it was to remedy their failure to provide equal educational opportunity 
to black children.”); see also David A. Gamson, Kathryn A. McDermott & Douglas S. Reed, The 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act at Fifty: Aspirations, Effects, and Limitations, 1 RUSSELL 
SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 1, 3 (2015) (discussing the importance of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act). 
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desegregation. Over the last decade, states have significantly cut education 
funding and have refused to reinstate funding even as their economies 
improved.12 The effects of these cuts often have hit low-income and minority 
school districts hardest.13 This regression marks a troubling new era in which 
states are willing to actively disregard their duty under state constitutions to 
deliver equal educational opportunities.14 
Although complete discretion allows states to adapt solutions to local 
needs, it also allows states to ignore the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act’s historical mission of equal opportunity and supplemental resources for 
low-income students. The ESSA’s framework will, in effect, make equal 
educational opportunity a random occurrence rather than a legal guarantee. First, 
the ESSA grants states nearly unfettered discretion to create school performance 
systems and set goals. States are largely free to weight test results and soft 
variables however they see fit.15 With this discretion, as many as fifty disparate 
state systems could follow. Second, even assuming states adopt reasonable 
performance systems, the ESSA does not specify the remedies or interventions 
that states must implement when schools underperform.16 Third, the ESSA 
undermines principles that have long stood at the center of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act’s mission to ensure equal access to resources.17 In 
particular, the ESSA weakens two equity standards18 and leaves a significant 
loophole in a third one that, in effect, exempts 80 percent of school expenditures 
from equity analyses.19 To make matters worse, Congress did not include any 
                                                 
 12. Michael Leachman et al., Most States Have Cut School Funding, and Some Continue 
Cutting, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES 1 (2015), 
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/12-10-15sfp.pdf [https://perma.cc/HR3X-3G42]. 
 13. Derek W. Black, Averting Educational Crisis: Funding Cuts, Teacher Shortages, and the 
Dwindling Commitment to Public Education, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 423, 433–34 (2016). 
 14. All fifty state constitutions obligate their state to deliver education. See Derek W. Black, 
Reforming School Discipline, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2016). States, however, have recently begun to 
resist court efforts to enforce those duties. The Washington Supreme Court, for instance, struggled to 
secure state compliance with its orders. See, e.g., Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1251 (Kan. 2014) 
(directing state to cure funding failures); Order at 2, McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7 (Wash. Aug. 13, 
2015) (fining state for refusal to comply with school funding order). 
 15. Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), Pub. L. No. 114-95, § 1111(c)(4), 129 Stat. 1802 
(2015). 
 16. Id. at § 1111(d)(1)(B)(ii) (specifying that the intervention is “evidence-based”). 
 17. For instance, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act has long included a resource 
comparability standard, a maintenance of effort standard, and a prohibition on supplanting local funds 
with federal funds. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 3807(a)–(c) (1982). For an explanation of how those standards 
originally worked, see Derek W. Black, The Congressional Failure to Enforce Equal Protection 
Through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 313, 336–40 (2010); McClure, 
supra note 2. 
 18. See ESSA § 1012 (striking and replacing portions of 20 U.S.C. § 6321). 
 19. Black, supra note 2, at 315–16 (characterizing the comparability standard as pointless 
because it excludes teacher salaries from review). The former Secretary of Education drew congressional 
hostility in response. See infra notes 302–18 and accompanying text; see also Cory Turner, The 
‘Intolerable’ Fight over School Money, NPR (May 18, 2016, 4:52 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2016/05/18/478358412/the-intolerable-fight-over-school-money 
[https://perma.cc/35CX-U23Y]. 
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significant increases in federal funding and instead afforded states more 
discretion in spending existing funds.20 
This random and uncertain approach to equality ultimately will render the 
ESSA an incoherent extension of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. 
During the past half century, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act has 
embraced differing theories of how best to achieve equal educational 
opportunity. The early decades focused most heavily on educational inputs, 
whereas recent decades focused more on educational outcomes.21 But no 
reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act has ever 
fundamentally abandoned both inputs and outputs as levers for equality—until 
the ESSA. Without one of those commitments, the ESSA undermines its own 
raison d’être: improving education for low-income students by providing federal 
resources where states fall short.22 In place of this historical premise, the ESSA 
provides that states should decide the level of resources students receive and the 
standards to which they aspire. It removes the federal government from 
education at the cost of equal education for low-income students. 
The ESSA thus raises a fundamental question: What role should the federal 
government play in education? Traditionally, the federal government is involved 
in education because education is in our national interest, the Constitution 
commits the nation to equality, and educational shortfalls by states remain 
rampant.23 According to national assessments of student achievement, only one-
third of students are proficient in math and reading, and low-income and minority 
students’ achievement lags three years behind their peers by the eighth grade.24 
Substantial portions of this gap owe in no small part to the poor educational 
opportunities that states provide to many students.25 In real dollar terms, thirty-
one states funded education at a lower level in 2014 than they did in 2008.26 
                                                 
 20. Compare ESSA § 1002, with BOYLE & LEE, supra note 1, at 10 (charting Title I funding 
prior to ESSA); see also Orfield, supra note 7, at 285 (indicating that ESSA consolidated numerous 
small programs into a $1.6 billion block grant). 
 21. See generally BOYLE & LEE, supra note 1. 
 22. JULIE ROY JEFFREY, EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN OF THE POOR: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS 
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT OF 1965 at 57–76 
(1978) (detailing the motivations for and debates about providing additional resources to students living 
in concentrated poverty so that they might receive compensatory education). 
 23. See generally Johnson, supra note 3 (discussing the importance of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act and describing it as “a major new commitment of the federal government to 
quality and equality in the schooling that we offer our young people”). 
 24. 2015 Mathematics—National Results Overview, NAT’L ASSESSMENT OF EDUC. PROGRESS, 
https://www.nationsreportcard.gov/reading_math_2015/#mathematics?grade=4 
[https://perma.cc/5YYY-937D]; 2015 Reading—National Results Overview, NAT’L ASSESSMENT OF 
EDUC. PROGRESS, https://www.nationsreportcard.gov/reading_math_2015/#reading?grade=4 
[https://perma.cc/PM9B-JF9H]. 
 25. See generally C. Kirabo Jackson, Rucker C. Johnson & Claudia Persico, The Effects of 
School Spending on Educational and Economic Outcomes: Evidence from School Finance Reforms, 
131 Q. J. ECON. 157 (2016) (reviewing decades of school finance and achievement data and finding that 
a substantial portion of achievement gaps are the result of funding inequality). 
 26. Leachman et al., supra note 12, at 1. 
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Likewise, recent data show that half of the states fund districts serving 
predominantly poor students at lower levels than they do districts serving 
predominantly middle-income and wealthy students.27 To achieve their potential, 
low-income students require more resources than their peers—not less.28 
As a practical matter, Congress is unlikely to repeal or substantially alter 
the ESSA as states begin to implement it, but new legislation is possible sooner 
rather than later. By its own terms, the ESSA is set to expire in four years.29 
Debates regarding whether to extend the ESSA by simple resolution or to fully 
rewrite it should precede that date. By then—if this Article’s critique is 
accurate—the random and uncertain equality that the ESSA facilitates will be 
evident. Equally important, there will be an opportunity to consider meaningful 
legislation because the pre-ESSA emphasis on repealing the NCLB will be gone. 
This Article proposes three steps to cure the ESSA’s flaws and further the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act’s original mission. First, the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, in the short term, must mandate that 
states fund schools serving predominantly low-income students at a level equal 
to or higher than other schools and, in the long term, must mandate that they fund 
such schools at proportionately higher levels. One of the most consistent findings 
of the past fifty years is that attending a school serving high concentrations of 
low-income students negatively affects educational outcomes—regardless of a 
student’s individual race or socioeconomic status.30 An equity mandate would 
also incentivize states to deconcentrate poverty and thereby minimize the 
number of instances they would need to afford schools proportionately more 
funds. Curing funding inequalities between schools, however, may be out of 
immediate reach for most states. Therefore, Congress should afford states a 
transition period to incrementally progress toward those goals or, in the 
alternative, allow states to demonstrate that their low-income students are 
achieving at appropriate levels notwithstanding unequal resource allocations. 
Because states are unlikely to accept ambitious equity standards in 
exchange for the currently low federal funding, the second step is for the federal 
government to substantially increase its own funding for low-income students. 
A substantial additional investment would strongly incentivize states to accept 
the first proposal and allow the federal government to directly ensure that low-
income students receive the additional resources necessary to close achievement 
                                                 
 27. See BRUCE D. BAKER, DAVID G SCIARRA & DANIELLE FARRIE, EDUC. LAW CTR., IS 
SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL REPORT CARD 9 (2015) (comparing states with progressive and 
regressive funding practices). 
 28. See Education Finance Incentive Grant Program, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1125(A), 115 Stat. 
1425, 1525 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6337(b)(3)(A)(ii)(III)) (using a 1.4 multiplier as the standard for 
assessing fair funding in low-income schools). 
 29. Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), Pub. L. No. 114-95, § 1002, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015). 
 30. See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS 
SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 6 (2001); Laura B. Perry & Andrew McConney, Does 
the SES of the School Matter? An Examination of Socioeconomic Status and Student Achievement Using 
PISA 2003, 112 TCHRS. C. REC. 1137, 1137–38 (2010). 
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gaps. Researchers and the federal government indicate that low-income students 
require 40 percent more resources than other students.31 By increasing annual 
federal funding for low-income students from the current $15 billion to $45 
billion, the federal government could cover half of the cost of low-income 
students’ additional needs (although a lesser number could still create the 
leverage necessary for states to act).32 Compared to other expenditures, including 
recent temporary federal funds for education, this increase would still be a 
modest expenditure. 
Third, this Article proposes a large short-term investment in preschool 
education. While the ESSA included $250 million for preschool education,33 this 
amount is far too small to make a dent in current preschool needs. Data show 
that fewer than one-third of four-year-olds and only 5 percent of three-year-olds 
have access to public preschool education.34 Social science widely supports the 
necessity of preschool education for closing achievement gaps.35 Preschool 
education is also the most cost-effective means of reducing other long-term costs 
associated with special education, juvenile justice, incarceration, and social 
services.36 Thus, federal investment in preschool education would have positive 
reciprocal effects on this Article’s first two proposals. The savings that preschool 
education produces would reinforce states’ abilities to meet the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act’s equal resource standards and offset the need for 
federal investment in preschool education in the first instance. 
This Article develops its critique and proposed solution in four parts. Part I 
describes the history of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, including 
its longstanding commitments to equal educational resources for disadvantaged 
students and academic achievement improvements. Part I also includes a detailed 
discussion of the NCLB and its flaws, which form the political and practical 
backdrop for the ESSA’s enactment. Part II describes the overall requirements 
of the ESSA, and how those requirements interact with each other and compare 
to the NCLB. Part III evaluates the ESSA’s provisions through the lens of 
equality and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act’s historical premises, 
concluding that the ESSA is conceptually and practically flawed. Part IV offers 
solutions to address those flaws. 
                                                 
 31. Education Finance Incentive Grant Program § 1125(A); Ross Wiener & Eli Pristoop, How 
States Shortchange the Districts that Need the Most Help, in FUNDING GAPS 2006 at 5, 6 (2006) 
(applying a 40 percent adjustment in additional funding for low-income students); see also U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-234, SCHOOL FINANCE: PER-PUPIL SPENDING DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN SELECTED INNER CITY AND SUBURBAN SCHOOLS VARIED BY METROPOLITAN AREA 5–6 
(2002), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03234.pdf [https://perma.cc/EP4E-T3PA] (discussing various 
funding weights for disadvantaged demographic groups). 
 32. See infra, note 350. 
 33. ESSA § 9212. 
 34. NAT’L INST. FOR EARLY EDUC. RES., THE STATE OF PRESCHOOL 2015 at 6 (2016). 
 35. James E. Ryan, A Constitutional Right to Preschool?, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 49, 52 (2006) 
(“[R]esearchers have uniformly demonstrated [that] the benefits of preschool . . . seem easily to 
outweigh the costs.”). 
 36. Id. 
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I. 
HISTORY OF THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT 
A. Equity Mission of the Early Decades 
At its inception in 1965, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act was 
a tool to ensure equal educational opportunities for poor and disadvantaged 
students. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act sought to achieve this, 
first, by providing additional resources for disadvantaged students and, second, 
by creating financial leverage to force recalcitrant school districts to desegregate. 
In other words, the Act was both part of President Johnson’s War on Poverty37 
and the federal government’s effort to make good on Brown v. Board of 
Education’s desegregation mandate.38 
The agenda to effectuate anti-poverty through education was obvious. 
President Johnson characterized the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
as 
the most sweeping educational bill ever to come before Congress. It 
represents a major new commitment of the federal government to 
quality and equality in the schooling that we offer our young people. I 
predict that all of those of both parties of Congress who supported the 
enactment of this legislation will be remembered in history as men and 
women who began a new day of greatness in American society. . . . As 
a son of a tenant farmer, I know that education is the only valid passport 
from poverty.39 
The Act drastically expanded federal funding for schools, which previously 
was almost nonexistent.40 Specifically, it drove those funds toward schools 
serving large percentages of poor students.41 As a result, the impact on each 
student and school was more significant than it would have been through a 
general education aid package.42 This focused approach on concentrated poverty 
                                                 
 37. See, e.g., Gamson et al., supra note 11, at 1, 3; Julia Hanna, The Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act, HARV. GRADUATE SCH. OF EDUC. (Aug. 18, 2005), 
http://www.gse.harvard.edu/news/05/08/elementary-and-secondary-education-act 
[https://perma.cc/W253-E86C]. 
 38. Gamson et al., supra note 11, at 1, 11 (“ESEA’s commitment to spend federal funds was a 
forceful lever to induce compliance with the federal government’s nondiscrimination policies, a lever 
possibly more powerful than federal district court rulings.”). 
 39. Johnson, supra note 3, at 1–2. 
 40. See Emily Hodge, Kendra Taylor & Erica Frankenberg, Lessons from the Past, Model for 
the Future: A Return to Promoting Integration Through a Reauthorized ESEA, 3 EDUC. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 58, 70 (2016) (reporting that “southern and border states were receiving $176 million in federal 
education funding, but by 1966, almost $566 million was allocated to these states”). 
 41. See OFFICE OF EDUC., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, HISTORY OF TITLE 
I ESEA at 17 (1969); Goodwin Liu, Improving Title I Funding Equity Across States, Districts, and 
Schools, 93 IOWA L. REV. 973, 975 (2008); Orfield, supra note 7, at 276–77. 
 42. See, e.g., Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), ASS’N FOR EDUC. 
COMMC’NS & TECH., http://aect.site-ym.com/?page=elementary_and_secon [https://perma.cc/6T9N-
FPM6] (explaining that the Elementary and Secondary Education Act “was not meant as a general 
package of aid to all schools; the allocation formulas directed assistance to the local education agencies 
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also meant that, as a practical matter, federal dollars went to the locus of 
segregation—the South and the North’s larger cities.43 Given the existing 
education funding practices of states, those funds were sorely needed in poor and 
predominantly minority communities.44 
The law initially said little about what schools should do with or in 
exchange for the money.45 The Elementary and Secondary Education Act was 
not an attempt to change the teaching profession, reform education standards, or 
update curricula. In its most raw form, the Act was about providing additional 
money for those who needed it the most. The hope was that through additional 
money, low-income students might receive both the fundamental and 
supplemental programs and opportunities they needed to close the achievement 
gap.46 Thus, the Act’s only significant requirements during its early years were 
regarding the money itself.47 
After the first few years revealed that some districts had been wasting 
federal dollars or reducing the local resources devoted to education, the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act required that federal money be spent 
on programs and services that were truly “supplemental.”48 Federal dollars could 
only “supplement” the money that states and local districts were already 
spending on education; federal funds could not “supplant” local money.49 
Likewise, states and districts had to maintain their financial outlays for education 
from year to year, rather than slowly reducing them over time and incrementally 
supplanting local money with federal funds.50 Finally, the Act eventually 
required that the resources available in schools receiving money through Title I 
of the Act be “comparable” or equal to those in schools that did not receive Title 
I money.51 In other words, a school district would violate the Act if it spent only 
$1,500 per student at a Title I school while spending $2,000 per student at a non-
                                                 
(LEAs) with the greatest proportions of poor children. The funds were purposely distributed through 
state education agencies (SEAs) to avoid the perception that the federal government was intervening in 
the rights and obligations of states to provide public education and also to use the funds as leverage to 
upgrade the capabilities of SEAs themselves”). 
 43. Orfield, supra note 7, at 276–77. 
 44. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 8–10 (1973) (finding 
funding disparities in local schools). 
 45. See, e.g., McClure, supra note 2, at 13; see also OFFICE OF EDUC., supra note 41, at 23–25 
(discussing the lack of real reporting and monitoring of the funds during the first few years following 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act’s enactment). 
 46. See Black, supra note 2, at 338. 
 47. See, e.g., Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 
(1965) (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
 48. Amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. 91-230, § 
613, 84 Stat. 179 (1970) (instituting the “supplement not supplant” requirement to ensure that Title I 
funding was used in addition to, not in place of, state and local revenues). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Elementary and Secondary Education Amendment of 1969, Pub. L. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121-
170, §109, April 13, 1970. 
 51. Id.; see, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 116.26 (1972) (requiring comparability at a 5 percent variance 
between Title I and non-Title I schools); 45 C.F.R. § 116a.26 (1977) (same). 
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Title I school. In theory, school districts that did not treat predominantly poor 
schools equally would be ineligible for additional Title I dollars and thereby 
unable to use federal funds to close funding gaps that districts themselves had 
created. Beyond those measures, states and districts were largely free to pursue 
and deliver education as they saw fit.52 In fact, the Act specifically prohibited the 
federal government from exercising any authority over “the curriculum or 
internal educational processes of the schools.”53 
While the Elementary and Secondary Education Act did not explicitly 
address desegregation, Congress intended to use the Act to further desegregation. 
Driving funds to the high-poverty schools not only created the opportunity for 
resource equality, but also gave the federal government the ability to financially 
coerce schools to stop discriminatory practices. One year before Congress passed 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, it passed the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.54 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in all federally 
funded programs and authorizes federal agencies to enforce the prohibition.55 
Thus, by accepting education money, states and districts also agreed to comply 
with Title VI’s antidiscrimination mandate and administrative enforcement 
scheme. 
Although the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education declared 
state-sponsored school segregation unconstitutional, that declaration alone 
accomplished very little. Save a few outliers, schools were just as segregated in 
1964 as they had been when the Court decided Brown in 1954.56 The federal 
government hoped that, by extending federal dollars to school districts and 
attaching Title VI’s prohibitions to them, federal agencies could desegregate 
schools more effectively than federal courts could alone.57 That hope proved 
true: once financial consequences attached to segregation, many schools began 
implementing Brown’s requirements in earnest.58 According to scholars, 
“[w]ithout the newly available federal funds from ESEA, it is unlikely that the 
impacts of Title VI of the CRA would have acted as an effective incentive to 
                                                 
 52. Gary Orfield writes: “This agenda was far more oriented on equity issues than the policies 
in most states, a number of which were conducting bitter-end battles against civil rights. So it combined 
a generous increase in resources with a stern warning about fairness. Outside of channeling dollars and 
enforcing Constitutional rights, however, the federal government was to respect the tradition of state and 
local control of the schools.” Orfield, supra note 7, at 276–77. 
 53. Id. at 276. 
 54. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
 55. Id. 
 56. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FULFILLING THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE LAW: 
DESEGREGATION OF THE NATION’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 6 (1976) (“Ten years after Brown, only 1.2 
percent of the nearly 3 million black students in the 11 Southern States attended school with white 
students.”), https://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/cr12l412.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3HHZ-8D75]. 
 57. GARY ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS AND 
THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 46, 77 (1969). 
 58. DEREK W. BLACK, EDUCATION LAW: EQUALITY, FAIRNESS, AND REFORM 28 (2013). 
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change local practices that maintained school segregation.”59 In the following 
decade, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act worked in conjunction 
with both other anti-discrimination statutes covering gender, disability, and 
language and other equal education opportunity funding programs for 
disadvantaged student groups.60 
This early approach to the federal role in education—both in design and 
function—was a quintessential effort to ensure equality. When states 
shortchanged poor students and districts, Congress intervened to provide more 
funds and prohibit the underlying unequal distribution of resources itself. States 
and districts had long funded the education of African American students at 
levels far below that of whites.61 Likewise, states left poor school districts— 
regardless of their racial demographics—to fend for themselves, which in turn 
could yield per-pupil expenditures well below those in wealthier districts.62 But 
even where general education funding was equal, schools did little—if 
anything—to meet the special needs of poor, at-risk, or needy students.63 Even 
the best schools simply expected these students to succeed with the same 
resources as the general student population and no additional attention to their 
special needs. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act’s stated purpose 
was to end this disadvantageous treatment: 
In recognition of the special educational needs of children of low-
income families and the impact that concentrations of low-income 
families have on the ability of local educational agencies to support 
adequate educational programs, the Congress hereby declares it to be 
the policy of the United States to provide financial assistance . . . to 
local educational agencies serving areas with concentrations of children 
from low-income families to expand and improve their educational 
programs by various means (including preschool programs) which 
contribute particularly to meeting the special educational needs of 
educationally deprived children.64 
                                                 
 59. Hodge et al., supra note 40, at 69. 
 60. The Elementary and Secondary School Act of 1965 was amended in 1968 to include the 
Bilingual Education Act, which offered federal aid to local school districts to help address the needs of 
children with limited English-speaking ability. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, SOC. 
WELFARE HIST. PROJECT, http://socialwelfare.library.vcu.edu/programs/education/elementary-and-
secondary-education-act-of-1965 [https://perma.cc/4T92-EEGV]; see also Harvey Kantor & Robert 
Lowe, Educationalizing the Welfare State and Privatizing Education: The Evolution of Social Policy 
Since the New Deal, in CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP 25, 32 (Prudence Carter & Kevin Welner eds., 
2013) (“In the 1970s, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provided the rationale for the extension of 
civil rights protections to English language learners and disabled children, and Title I of ESEA remained 
the programmatic foundation on which future federal education policies would be built.”). 
 61. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 7–8, 332, 349 (2011). 
 62. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 8–10 (1973) (discussing 
wide funding disparities between Texas school districts). 
 63. See, e.g., Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
 64. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 § 201 
(1965). 
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Elementary and Secondary Education Act funds created the means to 
expand the federal government’s equality mission beyond just poverty. Those 
funds became the leverage to demand all of the equality norms and federal 
affirmative educational obligations—from disability, sex, and gender to 
language, homelessness, and sexual orientation—that we have today.65 
B. Evolution in Later Decades 
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act’s focus on equity began to 
drift in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This drift stemmed from a confluence of 
events: the growing disillusionment with desegregation, the disappointment in 
the academic results that federal funding produced, and the resurgence of states’ 
rights.66 While desegregation rapidly progressed during the 1970s,67 the U.S. 
Supreme Court issued two key decisions limiting the scope of desegregation, 
suggesting a weakened resolve.68 Congress also passed troubling legislation 
prohibiting the use of federal funds for desegregation busing.69 Similarly, while 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act had helped improve access to the 
most basic and rudimentary education resources,70 many began to question the 
efficacy of the Act’s approach because research still had not proven that the 
funding helped close achievement gaps.71 Finally, Ronald Reagan premised his 
presidency on returning control and resources to the states.72 Consolidating 
                                                 
 65. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, IN BROWN’S WAKE: LEGACIES OF AMERICA’S EDUCATIONAL 
LANDMARK 5–6 (2010) (“[Brown] inspired social movements to pursue equal schooling beyond racial 
differences, and it yielded successful legal and policy changes addressing the treatment of students’ 
language, gender, disability, immigration status, socioeconomic status, religion, and sexual 
orientation.”). 
 66. See Kara S. Finnigan, Jennifer Jellison Holme & Joanna Sánchez, Regional Equity as an 
Educational Policy Goal: Tackling the Root Cause of Educational “Failure,” 3 EDUC. L. & POL’Y REV. 
166, 171 (2016) (discussing “a growing dissatisfaction with and disillusionment around desegregation 
on the ground”); Jack Jennings, Fifty Years of Federal Aid to School: Back into the Future?, 3 EDUC. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 1, 10 (2016) (describing President Obama’s critiques of the effects of federal school aid, 
and President Clinton’s move to shift the development of academic standards to states); Republican 
Party Platform of 1984, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 20, 1984), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25845 [https://perma.cc/JR29-A33B] (summarizing Ronald 
Reagan’s general campaign platform to return control to the states). 
 67. GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, BROWN AT 50: KING’S DREAM OR PLESSY’S 
NIGHTMARE? 19 (2004) (charting increases and declines in integration). 
 68. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
 69. 20 U.S.C. § 1652 (1972). 
 70. See, e.g., Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
https://www.ed.gov/essa?src=rn [https://perma.cc/ARD7-YGA6] (“ESEA offered new grants to 
districts serving low-income students, federal grants for textbooks and library books, [and] funding for 
special education centers . . . .”). 
 71. Jennings, supra note 66, at 11–12 (2016) (finding that Title I was inefficient because it only 
indirectly provided additional funds for extra services and did not change “American schools broadly 
and positively enough to bring a good education to all students”). 
 72. See AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, supra note 66 (summarizing Ronald Reagan’s general 
campaign platform to return control to the states). 
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federal programs into block grants to states was one way to shrink federal 
dictates and oversight.73 
The foregoing concerns eventually led to changes in the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act. Funding for Title I of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act stopped growing.74 And rather than targeting existing funds to the 
neediest students, the Act began to more closely resemble general education 
aid,75 with far more schools and districts receiving Title I funds and far more 
funds being issued through consolidated or block grants.76 The Act also placed 
less emphasis on prodding resource equity with those funds. For instance, 
Congress loosened the Elementary and Secondary Education Act’s 
comparability requirements in Title I. Title I and its regulations originally 
permitted no more than a 5 percent variance in spending between Title I and non-
Title I schools.77 In the late 1970s, the regulations doubled the permissible 
variance to 10 percent,78 thereby allowing the gap between disadvantaged 
schools and privileged schools to expand. Later, the Reagan administration 
eliminated quantifiable measures of comparability altogether.79 Overall, a 
heavier focus on academic standards, accountability, and school reform replaced 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act’s focus on resources as the means 
to achieve equity.80 
The 1990s and 2000s saw some efforts at redirecting the law back toward 
equity. The 1994 reauthorization, Improving America’s School Act (IASA), 
added two funding formulas to Title I. The first formula was designed to drive 
more funds toward those districts serving the largest number of poor students 
                                                 
 73. See, e.g., Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-35, tit. V, 
subdiv. D, 95 Stat. 463 (1981). 
 74. See Orfield, supra note 7, at 278–79. 
 75. See, e.g., Kenneth K. Wong & Anna C. Nicotera, Educational Quality and Policy Redesign: 
Reconsidering the NAR and Federal Title I Policy, 79 PEABODY J. EDUC., 87, 90 (2004) (indicating the 
Reagan administration “created an educational block grant, Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation 
and Improvement Act (ECIA), which consolidated 28 categorical programs and shifted authority for 
allocation from local agencies to the states,” under which “17 of the 26 largest urban districts received 
less federal revenue than they had in the immediate pre-block grant year”); Benjamin Michael Superfine 
& Craig De Voto, The ESEA and Teacher Workforce Management Systems, 3 EDUC. L. & POL’Y REV. 
241, 253 (2016) (“Through the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, many of the 
targeting and reporting requirements of Title I were eliminated, federal education funding was cut, and 
categorical programs were consolidated into a single block grant. Such moves were ultimately undone 
as the political climate shifted.”). 
 76. CHERYL D. HAYES, RETHINKING BLOCK GRANTS: TOWARD IMPROVED 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL FINANCING FOR EDUCATION AND OTHER CHILDREN’S SERVICES 11 (1995), 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED394193.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9QG-TPNP] (“In the education block 
grant, states retreated from targeting funds to big-city schools with large minority populations.”). 
 77. See 45 C.F.R. § 116a.26 (1977) (requiring comparability at a 5 percent variance); 45 C.F.R. 
§ 116.26 (1972) (same). 
 78. McClure, supra note 2, at 18; see also 45 C.F.R. § 116 (1978) (making no reference to 
numerical comparability). 
 79. See Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 § 558(c)(2), 95 Stat. at 468. 
 80. Finnigan et al., supra note 66, at 170–71. 
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and those serving higher percentages of poor students.81 The second formula was 
designed to incentivize states to equalize their own school funding formulas.82 
The IASA also took steps to hold states accountable for the quality of education 
they provided poor students, requiring states to establish academic standards for 
math and language arts and then to test students every few years in those subjects. 
In Goals 2000, a separate bill passed a few months later, states were also 
encouraged to develop “opportunity-to-learn” standards. As Michael Rebell 
explained: 
Congress articulated the concept of “opportunity to learn standards” 
(“OTL”), voluntary national school delivery standards that states could 
choose to adopt, or state OTL standards that states could develop in 
conjunction with their own content and student performance standards. 
The statute defined the OTL concept as “the criteria for, and the basis 
of, assessing the sufficiency or quality of the resources, practices, and 
conditions necessary at each level of the education system . . . to 
provide all students with the opportunity to learn the material in 
voluntary national content standards or State content standards.”83 
Congress hoped it could demand equal academic outputs through the IASA 
and prod equal academic inputs through Goals 2000. However, a new 
Republican majority revoked the voluntary OTL standards later that year.84 
The largest expansion of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
occurred in 2002 through the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). To be clear, 
the NCLB did nothing to strengthen comparability or other resource equality 
requirements. Rather, it demanded strict output equality and infused schools with 
the largest increase in federal funding since the 1960s. Pre-NCLB appropriations 
for Title I were approximately $7 billion.85 In its first five years, the NCLB nearly 
doubled Title I funding86 and increased it each year thereafter, although actual 
appropriations never matched the authorization levels.87 
                                                 
 81. Black, supra note 2, at 344–46. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary 
Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1517 (2007). 
 84. Id. 
 85. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 10 FACTS ABOUT K-12 EDUCATION FUNDING 4 (2005), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/10facts/10facts.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EL3-BUZ3]. 
 86. Id. Unfortunately, actual funding appropriations have consistently fallen short of 
authorizations since 2002. In 2003, for instance, Congress appropriated only $12 billion of the authorized 
$16 billion. PAUL M. IRWIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33058, K-12 EDUCATION PROGRAMS: 
RECENT APPROPRIATIONS 6–8 (2005) http://www.oswego.edu/~ruddy/Educational Policy/CRS 
Reports/K-12 Education-Appropriations.pdf [https://perma.cc/43LG-VPQZ]. 
 87. The authorization for 2008 was $25 billion while the appropriation was $14 billion. See, 
e.g., NEW AMERICA, NCLB FUNDING OVERVIEW (2015). As Rebell emphasizes, a central flaw of the 
Act was its failure to ensure students had access to the resources they needed to achieve. Rebell, supra 
note 83, at 72–76; see also Regina R. Umpstead, The No Child Left Behind Act: Is It an Unfunded 
Mandate or a Promotion of Federal Educational Ideals?, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 193, 227 (2008) (finding that 
the Act covered states’ administrative costs, but not the cost of getting students to proficiency). 
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C. No Child Left Behind Act as the Backdrop for Current Policy 
1. NCLB’s Structure 
The NCLB imposed far more requirements and accountability than any 
prior version of Title I. In exchange for an influx of resources, it required states 
to meet several absolute benchmarks. First, it required states to adopt 
“challenging” academic standards for English, math, and science.88 The goal was 
to ensure that students received high-quality curricula and learning 
opportunities.89 However, states remained free to craft the substance of those 
standards and curricula as they saw fit.90 
Second, the NCLB required states to administer tests to assess student 
proficiency in those subjects.91 The math and English assessments occurred 
annually in grades three through eight and at least once more in high school.92 
The science assessment occurred at least three times between grades three and 
twelve.93 
Third, the NCLB required states to ensure that students met certain 
benchmarks, which it termed “adequate yearly progress” (AYP).94 The Act 
required that all students achieve proficiency in English, math, and science by 
2014, with states setting their own interim targets along the way.95 For instance, 
a state might set a target of 50 percent proficiency for 2003, with 5 percent 
increases in proficiency in each subsequent year to meet full proficiency by 2014. 
Then each individual school in the state would have to meet those targets. 
Fourth, these proficiency standards and goals applied not only to individual 
schools but also to subgroups within those schools.96 Schools had to disaggregate 
their test scores by gender, race, ethnicity, disability, language status, and 
socioeconomic status to ensure that each subgroup met the same benchmarks.97 
The failure of the school or any of its subgroups to meet these benchmarks would 
result in a failure to make AYP under the NCLB.98 
                                                 
 88. No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001, Pub. L. 107-100, § 1111(b)(1), 115 Stat. 1425 
(2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6311); see also Ryan, supra note 1, at 932–33 (providing a brief 
summary of the Act’s requirements). 
 89. See, e.g., NCLB § 1111(b)(1)(D). NCLB requirements were thought to further a high-
quality curriculum and learning opportunity. See generally Ryan, supra note 1, at 939 (“The federal 
government hoped to ensure that states would hold all students to the same high expectations and hold 
all schools, regardless of their student population, accountable for failure.”). 
 90. NCLB § 1111(a)(1) (stating that to receive funding, each state educational agency “shall 
submit to the Secretary a plan, developed by the State educational agency”). 
 91. Id. § 1111(a)(3)(A). 
 92. Id. §§ 1111(a)(3)(C)(v)(I), (vii). 
 93. Id. § 1111(a)(3)(C)(v)(II). 
 94. Id. § 1111(b)(2)(B). 
 95. Id. § 1111(b)(2)(F). 
 96. Id. § 1431(a) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6471). 
 97. Id. § 1111(b)(3)(C)(xiii). 
 98. Id. § 1111(b)(2)(C)(v) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6311). 
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Fifth, the failure to make AYP triggered specific consequences for schools 
receiving Title I funds. The second year a school failed to make AYP, it was 
labeled “in need of improvement.”99 With each subsequent consecutive year it 
failed to make AYP, the consequences ratcheted upward. In the second year, the 
school had to develop an improvement plan and receive technical assistance from 
the local education agency.100 The second year of failure also triggered students’ 
right to transfer to another public school in the district that had made AYP.101 
The third year triggered tutoring services at the district’s expense.102 The fourth 
year, schools had to replace school staff or implement a new curriculum.103 The 
fifth year of failure effectively resulted in closing the school, which could later 
be reopened under new management, typically as a state-run school or charter 
school.104 
Finally, the NCLB required that all teachers in “core academic subjects” be 
“highly qualified.”105 This requirement was stricter than the aforementioned 
standards and assessments requirements. It immediately prohibited Title I 
schools from hiring any new teachers who were not “highly qualified” and, 
within just a few years, required states to demonstrate that teachers in all schools 
were “highly qualified.”106 
2. Solving NCLB’s Problems Through Reauthorization 
Educators and scholars argued that the NCLB was flawed at its inception. 
Over time, the validity of many of those critiques became obvious. The first set 
of critiques argued that the Act’s academic standards were too low and its 
expectations for student performance were too high. While the Act mandated 
that states adopt “challenging” academic standards, the Act afforded states 
discretion in setting those standards and developing the tests to assess them. 
                                                 
 99. Id. § 1117(a)(2)(B) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6317). 
 100. Id. § 1116 (b)(3)(A)(v) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6316). 
 101. If there was no such school in the district, the student theoretically could transfer to another 
school district, but the receiving school district was not obligated to accept the student. See Jane Dimyan-
Ehrenfeld, Making Lemonade: Restructuring the Transfer Provisions of the No Child Left Behind Act, 
16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 217–18 (2009). While civil rights advocates hoped that these 
provisions would facilitate both intra- and inter-district integration, for a variety of reasons, very few 
students were able to exercise their transfer options. See MEREDITH P. RICHARDS, KORI J. STROUB & 
JENNIFER JELLISON HOLME, CENTURY FOUND., CAN CHOICE WORK? MODELING THE EFFECTS OF 
INTERDISTRICT CHOICE ON STUDENT ACCESS TO HIGHER-PERFORMING SCHOOLS 3 (2011) (fewer than 
1 percent of eligible African American and Hispanic students transfer); Goodwin Liu & William L. 
Taylor, School Choice to Achieve Desegregation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 791, 795 (2005) (criticizing the 
lack of a mandate in the transfer provision). 
 102. NCLB § 1116(b)(5) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6316). 
 103. Id. § 1116(b)(7). 
 104. See id. § 1116(b)(8). 
 105. Id. §§ 1119(a)(1)–(2), 9101(11), 9101(23) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 7801). States, however, 
had significant flexibility in determining whether a teacher was highly qualified, which later became a 
source of contention. See, e.g., Renee v. Duncan, 623 F.3d 787, 795–96 (9th Cir. 2010) (invalidating a 
Department of Education regulation permitting alternative teacher certification programs in California). 
 106.  NCLB §§ 1119(a)(1)–(2) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6319). 
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Rather than ensuring a core base of knowledge and quality, the Act permitted 
substantial variation among states.107 Some states seemingly strived to improve 
education, but as James Ryan immediately pointed out, the flexibility 
incentivized most states to lower their academic standards and self-determined 
cutoff scores to inflate proficiency scores.108 Later studies confirmed this 
suspicion.109 
The mandate that 100 percent of students reach proficiency was unrealistic 
under any circumstances. Statistically speaking, a certain percentage of students 
will inevitably fail to achieve any reasonable concept of proficiency each year 
due to random events, differences in ability, and background inequalities.110 The 
NCLB made no allowance for these factors. Thus, it was no surprise that a 
substantial percentage of schools immediately began missing AYP targets.111 By 
2012, 80 percent of the nation’s public schools were not making AYP and had 
almost no hope of achieving full proficiency by the Act’s deadline.112 
Oversight and quality concerns aside, others saw a more fundamental 
problem with the NCLB’s testing regime. They argued that the emphasis on 
standardized testing itself would have a corrosive effect on education. Struggling 
schools would “teach to the test,” “drill and kill,” and focus on the mechanics of 
test taking, thereby restricting teaching methods and narrowing curricula.113 
Thus, focusing heavily on testing would widen the academic gap between 
advantaged and disadvantaged groups. The high-achieving schools would 
continue to focus on deeper and more enriching learning experiences, while the 
low-performing schools would spend excessive time on test preparation. This 
concern proved true in many instances.114 Moreover, the overriding focus on test 
                                                 
 107. See EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES, ECS REPORT TO THE NATION: STATE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT 18 (2004) (illustrating the differences among 
the state standards allowed under NCLB). 
 108. Ryan, supra note 1, at 934. 
 109. See, e.g., Paul E. Peterson & Frederick M. Hess, Few States Set World-Class Standards, 8 
EDUC. NEXT 70, 71–73 (2008) (finding many states had lowered their standards); BANDIERA DE 
MELLO, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION SCIENCES, MAPPING STATE PROFICIENCY 
STANDARDS ONTO THE NAEP SCALES: VARIATION AND CHANGE IN STATE STANDARDS FOR READING 
AND MATHEMATICS, 2005–2009 at 2 (2011). 
 110. See generally Derek W. Black, Civil Rights, Charter Schools, and Lessons to Be Learned, 
64 FLA. L. REV. 1723, 1752–56 (2012) (describing perceptions of the goal). 
 111. EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES, supra note 107, at 18 (showing that in March 2003, only 
55 percent of schools appeared on track to meet proficiency goals). 
 112. See Derek W. Black, Federalizing Education by Waiver?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 607, 612 
(2015). 
 113. See, e.g., Linda Darling-Hammond, Evaluating “No Child Left Behind”: The Problems and 
Promises of Bush’s Education Policy, NATION (May 2, 2007), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/evaluating-no-child-left-behind [https://perma.cc/T7A3-EDSW]; 
Peter Schrag, High Stakes Are for Tomatoes, ATLANTIC (Aug. 2000), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2000/08/high-stakes-are-for-tomatoes/378306 
[https://perma.cc/C8TA-VW96]. 
 114. Schools began to cut programs such as physical education and the arts to allow for more 
time spent in the classroom on courses tested under the NCLB. Two weeks each year would be spent on 
testing alone. See, e.g., Tina Beveridge, No Child Left Behind and Fine Arts Classes, 111 ARTS EDUC. 
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results and meeting AYP standards motivated some teachers and school districts 
to cheat.115 In some areas, parents concerned with such corrosive effects 
eventually formed a concerted movement to keep their kids out of school on 
testing days.116 
Yet another group argued that the NCLB’s testing and accountability 
regime ignored the structural inequalities generally pervading education. 
Schools were separate and unequal prior to the NCLB and remained separate and 
unequal after its enactment. The NCLB simply attached labels and consequences 
to that separation and inequality without taking steps to remedy them. Instead, 
the NCLB seemed to make matters worse. The NCLB, in effect, punished the 
predominantly poor and minority schools that it purportedly was designed to 
help.117 
With its stringent demands for increased test results, the NCLB also 
mischaracterized otherwise adequate schools as “failing.”118 This created a new 
and purportedly objective narrative that characterized America’s schools as 
failing.119 This perception intensified dissatisfaction with public education and 
motivated those with the means to exit traditional public schools in general and 
poor and minority schools in particular. Many parents increasingly advocated for 
federal funding of charter schools and voucher programs to help facilitate that 
                                                 
POL’Y REV. 4, 4–5 (2010); Ken Reed, Physical Education Trend Must Be Reversed, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Aug. 31, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ken-reed/physical-education-trend-_b_3845922.html 
[https://perma.cc/N3D8-4U2Y] (“Due to No Child Left Behind mandates and the pressures of 
standardized state assessment tests, many schools are cutting back on physical education and recess 
under the mistaken belief that kids need more desk time to improve test scores.”). 
 115. See, e.g., Alan Blinder, Atlanta Educators Convicted in School Cheating Scandal, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 1, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2jOlmPD [https://perma.cc/7ECM-AQYC]; Valerie Strauss, Why 
Not Subpoena Everyone in D.C. Cheating Scandal—Rhee Included?, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2013/04/12/why-not-subpoena-everyone-in-
d-c-cheating-scandal-rhee-included/?utm_term=.b2ff6f03b031 [https://perma.cc/B25Q-AK23] 
(describing investigations into widespread cheating on standardized tests by teachers in Washington, 
D.C. schools). 
 116. See Michelle Croft, Opt-Outs: What Is Lost When Students Do Not Test, ACT RES. & POL’Y 
1, 1 (2015) (citing substantial decreases in test participation in several states). This created problems for 
the schools because the NCLB required that 95 percent of students take the tests. No Child Left Behind 
Act (NCLB) of 2001, Pub. L. 107-100, § 1111(b)(2)(I)(ii), 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C. 
§ 6311); see also U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Officer of Elementary and Secondary Educ., Opinion Letter on 
Requirements Under Elementary and Secondary Educ. Act of 1965, as Amended by the No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001 (Dec. 22, 2015) (letter to states addressing the 95 percent assessment requirement 
in response to the failure of several states to comply during academic year 2014–2015). 
 117. Darling-Hammond, supra note 113; James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School 
Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1223, 1228 (2008). 
 118. See generally Seventy Percent of Schools to “Fail,” FAIRTEST, 
http://www.fairtest.org/seventy-percent-schools-fail [https://perma.cc/C2GW-7E5A] (indicating that it 
is “counterintuitive” that North Carolina would have to label 60 to 70 percent of its schools in need of 
improvement because the state “has made some of the best academic progress in the nation”). 
 119. See generally DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL 
SYSTEM: HOW TESTING AND CHOICE ARE UNDERMINING EDUCATION 99–111 (2010) (discussing the 
punitive nature of NCLB, its impossible goals, and, thus, the inevitable failure of schools). 
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exit.120 Even where flight from public schools did not occur, the NCLB 
incentivized families with means to avoid schools with low or even average test 
scores. Data suggest that this has intensified racial and socioeconomic 
stratification among schools.121 
Finally, while the NCLB appropriately focused on the most important 
education input—“highly qualified teachers”—it did very little to increase state 
and local capacity to achieve that goal. As one of the most resource-dependent 
and substantively challenging aspects of improving education, securing high-
quality teachers was also the NCLB requirement that states most quickly and 
clearly failed.122 As such, it was the one aspect of the law that Congress altered 
(and watered down) well in advance of the NCLB’s final timelines.123 
3. Supplanting NCLB’s Requirements Through Waivers 
These failures, coupled with Congress’s lack of a legislative fix, set the 
stage for Secretary of Education Arne Duncan to exert an unprecedented level of 
influence on education policy between 2008 and 2011. The NCLB was set to 
expire by its own terms in 2007.124 But the political demands and fallout of the 
                                                 
 120. See generally Black, supra note 13; see also Preston C. Green III et al., Are We Heading 
Toward a Charter School “Bubble”?: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 
783, 783–86 (2016) (examining the rapid expansion of the charter school sector and the possibility that 
a “bubble” that risks market collapse may have developed). 
 121. Seungbok Choi, A Study on Charter School Effects on Student Achievement and on 
Segregation in Florida Public Schools 22 (Mar. 20, 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State 
University) (on file with the Florida State University Libraries) (discussing various studies that found 
increased racial and socioeconomic stratification due to migration to charter schools); see generally U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-345, K-12 EDUCATION: BETTER USE OF INFORMATION 
COULD HELP AGENCIES IDENTIFY DISPARITIES AND ADDRESS RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 10 (2016) 
(“Over time, there has been a large increase in schools that are the most isolated by poverty and race.”). 
 122. See EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES, supra note 107, at 63 (“In March 2004, 23 states 
appeared to be on track to meet the Highly Qualified Teachers Definition requirement, compared with 
10 in March 2003.”); see also CAL. STATE BD. OF EDUC., CALIFORNIA’S REVISED STATE PLAN FOR NO 
CHILD LEFT BEHIND: HIGHLY QUALIFIED TEACHER 6–7 (revealing substantial percentages of core 
academic classes in the state were not taught by highly qualified teachers) (2006). The numbers would 
have been even worse if not for the U.S. Department of Education’s permissive interpretation of “highly 
qualified.” See 34 C.F.R. § 200.56 (2003), invalidated by Renee v. Duncan, 623 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 123. California initially attempted to hide its failure to meet the teacher quality requirements; 
plaintiffs sued and succeeded in their initial challenge. See Renee v. Duncan, 623 F.3d 787, 794–95, 800 
(9th Cir. 2010). Congress, however, later watered down the requirements in a way that allowed 
California to meet them. That decision, however, was rendered moot when Congress passed a fix that 
codified the Department’s watered-down definition of what it means to comply with the highly qualified 
teacher requirement. See Pub. L. No. 111-322, § 163(a), 124 Stat. 3521 (2010); see also Renee v. 
Duncan, 686 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing the congressional amendment to the statute 
“expanding the statutory definition of ‘highly qualified teacher’” subsequent to the court’s decision in 
2010). 
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Great Recession preempted any serious attempt at reauthorization. As a result, 
Congress left the NCLB in place and funded it through continuing resolutions. 
As an interim measure, Congress included temporary additional education 
funds in an economic stimulus bill.125 The Department of Education used those 
funds to create the Race to the Top (RTT) competitive grant program.126 Through 
RTT, the Department prompted a majority of states to move toward a common 
national curriculum; to begin hiring, evaluating, and firing teachers based on 
their students’ standardized test performance; and to expand the number of 
charter schools.127 
To be clear, however, the NCLB requirements remained in place and two 
years later, the Secretary of Education announced that 80 percent of the nation’s 
schools would fail to meet those requirements in the coming months,128 
triggering NCLB’s sanctions. To avoid this problematic scenario, the 
Department of Education agreed to waive state and local violations of the statute 
on the condition that states and districts adopt the exact policies that the 
Department promoted in RTT.129 First, states had to adopt “college- and career-
ready expectations for all students in . . . at least reading/language arts and 
mathematics” and develop assessments of that curriculum that “measure student 
growth.”130 Second, states had to “develop and implement a system of 
differentiated recognition, accountability, and support for all [schools],” which 
meant setting achievable annual measurable goals and focusing turnaround 
                                                 
 125. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 3, 123 Stat. 
115, 181 (2009). Moreover, $97 billion were allocated to cover states’ and local districts’ education 
budget shortfalls and to prevent massive teacher layoffs. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., AMERICAN RECOVERY 
AND REINVESTMENT ACT: SPENDING REPORT BY PROGRAM 1 (2011); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT REPORT: SUMMARY OF PROGRAMS AND STATE-BY-
STATE DATA 3–4 (2009), http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/leg/recovery/spending/arra-program-
summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3DS-9SDX]. A small but significant slice of those education funds 
were reserved for competitive grants. The Secretary of Education was authorized to use the funds to 
foster educational innovation and improvement. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 
14006. 
 126. 74 Fed. Reg. 59,836 (Nov. 18, 2009); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP PROGRAM: 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2009), https://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T37T-PQ4D]. 
 127. See Patrick McGuinn, Stimulating Reform: Race to the Top, Competitive Grants and the 
Obama Education Agenda, 26 EDUC. POL’Y 136, 143 (2012) (thirty-four of the forty states applying for 
an RTT grant adopted new reforms to improve their chances of receiving a grant); see also CTR. ON 
EDUC. POL’Y, AN EARLY LOOK AT THE ECONOMIC STIMULUS PACKAGE AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 2 
(2009) (reporting that forty-one states planned to apply for RTT grants even though the requirements 
were strict). Secretary Duncan cautioned that states that “put artificial caps on the growth of charter 
schools will jeopardize their applications under the Race to the Top Fund.” David Nagel, Charter School 
Support Is a Prerequisite for Race to the Top Funds, THEJOURNAL.COM (June 9, 2009), 
https://thejournal.com/articles/2009/06/09/charter-school-support-is-a-prerequisite-for-race-to-the-top-
funds.aspx [https://perma.cc/2ZRP-J2PA]. 
 128. Sam Dillon, Overriding a Key Education Law, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/08/education/08educ.html [https://perma.cc/2RCQ-WXJC]. 
 129. See Letter from Anthony Miller, U.S. Deputy Sec’y of Educ., to Chief State School Officers 
(Sept. 23, 2011). 
 130. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ESEA FLEXIBILITY 1 (2012). 
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strategies on the lowest-performing schools and those with the highest 
achievement gaps.131 Third, states and local districts had to adopt “teacher and 
principal evaluation and support systems” that “meaningfully differentiate 
[teacher] performance” into at least three levels based on “student growth” data 
and other factors.132 States and districts were to use that data to “evaluate 
teachers and principals on a regular basis” and to “inform personnel 
decisions.”133 Fourth, states had to “remove duplicative and burdensome 
reporting requirements that have little or no impact on student outcomes.”134 
Most states had little choice but to accept these conditions. By the end of 2012, 
those NCLB waivers and conditions displaced the NCLB’s statutory policies in 
forty-five states and moved education policy in an entirely distinct direction.135 
The NCLB waiver conditions substantively changed the federal education 
policies under which state and local education agencies operate. Whereas the 
NCLB had afforded states almost complete autonomy in setting curricular 
standards, the waiver conditions narrowed that autonomy by demanding career- 
and college-ready standards, which effectively meant adopting the Common 
Core or comparable standards.136 Similarly, whereas the NCLB had afforded 
states broad discretion to differentiate highly-qualified teachers from others—
through what one might term a certification process—the waiver conditions 
required regular statistical assessment of teachers based on their students’ 
standardized exam performance. The NCLB did not even remotely suggest such 
an approach to teacher evaluation. Together, the shifts in regard to curriculum 
and teachers also represented a global shift in substantive education 
policymaking from states to the federal government. Finally, the waivers simply 
eliminated the core pillars of the NCLB, most notably the goal of full proficiency 
for the overall student body and its subgroups, and the accountability measures 
designed to achieve full proficiency.137 
Initially, most states were so happy to escape the NCLB’s requirements that 
they expressed relatively little concern with the conditions and quickly adopted 
them.138 But over time, both grassroots and national political opposition arose 
                                                 
 131. Id. at 1–2. 
 132. Id. at 3. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. The Common Core refers to a set of standards that specify what students should learn at 
each grade level. The goal was for all states to adopt the Common Core so that education would be more 
uniform across the states and presumably of a higher quality. See generally Catherine Gewertz, The 
Common Core Explained, EDUC. WK. (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.edweek.org/ew/issues/common-
core-state-standards [https://perma.cc/3JBZ-6WQ4]. 
 137. Derek W. Black, Federalizing Education by Waiver?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 607, 673–74 
(2015). 
 138. Those states that had applied for RTT grants had already taken many of the necessary steps 
to meet these conditions. Others resisted the waivers. See, e.g., Miker Wiser, Feds Deny Iowa No Child 
Left Behind Waiver, WATERLOO–CEDAR FALLS COURIER (June 21, 2012), 
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against the substance of the waiver conditions and their imposition through 
administrative rather than legislative action. Many, including education 
committee chairs in the U.S Senate and House, questioned whether Secretary 
Duncan had the power to impose these conditions through administrative 
action.139 One state brought a lawsuit against the Department.140 Another state 
sought an administrative hearing, and others openly defied or challenged the 
Secretary’s position.141 As to the substance of the waivers, teachers across the 
country filed lawsuits against their states challenging the validity of the new 
teacher evaluation systems.142 Likewise, both educators and families began 
actively campaigning and litigating against the Common Core, which states had 
adopted to comply with the waiver conditions.143 
II. 
THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT 
As Part I suggested, the ESSA largely was a short-term reaction to current 
realities, not a thoughtful legislative effort to advance the federal role in 
education. The NCLB had run its course and failed. As an interim measure, 
NCLB waivers had implemented a new regulatory regime that had never been 
                                                 
http://wcfcourier.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/feds-deny-iowa-no-child-left-behind-
waiver/article_ee035d3a-bc09-11e1-9db6-0019bb2963f4.html [https://perma.cc/W93T-ES52]. 
 139. See, e.g., Alyson Klein, Waivers and ESEA Renewal Get Hard Look from Senators, EDUC. 
WK., (Feb. 7, 2013), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-
12/2013/02/senators_take_a_hard_look_at_w.html [https://perma.cc/4GYA-DEFB] (describing 
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No Child Left Behind Waiver, DESERET NEWS (June 6, 2014), 
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865604704/State-School-Board-divided-on-extending-No-Child-
Left-Behind-waiver.html [https://perma.cc/HZ54-2TL9] (describing how state officials questioned the 
Department’s authority one year after having received a waiver); see also EMILY BARBOUR, JODY 
FEDER & REBECCA SKINNER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, SECRETARY OF EDUCATION’S 
WAIVER AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO TITLE I-A PROVISIONS INCLUDED IN THE ELEMENTARY AND 
SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT 1 (2011) (responding to 2010 request by the House Committee on 
Education and the Workforce for analysis from the Congressional Research Service on the Secretary’s 
overall waiver power). 
 140. Jindal v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 14-CV-534, 2015 WL 854132 (M.D. La. Feb. 26, 2015). 
141. See, e.g., Rick Scott, Governor of Florida, Request to Designate Jurisdiction to the Office of 
Administrative Law Judges (Oct. 17, 2014); Sean D. Reyes, Attorney General, State of Utah, Common 
Core Standards Legal Analysis (Oct. 7, 2014); see also Barbour et al., supra note 139, at 6–7 (“[I]f the 
Secretary did, as a condition of granting a waiver, require a grantee to take another action not currently 
required under the ESEA, the likelihood of a successful legal challenge might increase, particularly if 
ED failed to sufficiently justify its rationale for imposing such conditions.”). 
 142. See, e.g., Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2015); Decision, Order and Judgment, 
Lederman v. King, No. 5443-14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 10, 2016); Findings and Conclusions and 
Memorandum Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, New Mexico v. New 
Mexico Pub. Educ. Dep’t, No. D-101-DV-2015-00409 (D. Nev. Dec. 2, 2015); Stephen Sawchuk, 
Teacher Evaluation Heads to the Courts, EDUC. WK. (Oct. 6, 2015), 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/section/multimedia/teacher-evaluation-heads-to-the-courts.html 
[https://perma.cc/L7CB-WRL9]. 
 143. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Cates v. Baesler, No. 14AC-
CC00477 (N.D. Dist. Ct. June 17, 2015). 
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sanctioned by the legislative process. This shortcut to ending the NCLB was 
creating substantial legal and political turmoil. To its credit, the ESSA solved the 
immediate problems that the NCLB and its waivers were creating. The more 
important question remains whether it solved any of the problems that necessitate 
a federal role in education in the first instance. The following sections outline 
the major requirements of the ESSA and the new federal role in education, 
particularly in academic standards, testing and accountability, teacher quality, 
and funding. 
A. Academic Standards 
The ESSA continues the NCLB’s requirement of “challenging” state 
academic standards.144 The ESSA, however, goes one step further and defines 
“challenging” standards as those designed to prepare students for college and 
careers.145 This definition represents a compromise between the NCLB’s initially 
hands-off approach and the subsequently rigid approach under the waivers. By 
leaving “challenging” undefined, the NCLB afforded states too much leeway to 
manipulate educational quality,146 and some appeared to take advantage.147 In 
contrast, the rigid demand for career- and college-ready standards under the 
NCLB waivers, in effect, compelled states to adopt the Common Core.148 This 
rigidity eventually produced an enormous backlash.149 
The ESSA attempts to manage a middle ground between these extremes. It 
explicitly indicates that states that previously adopted the Common Core are free 
to withdraw from it150 and that the Department is prohibited from compelling or 
even indirectly encouraging its adoption in the future.151 But the ESSA’s 
willingness to define “challenging” suggests states’ discretion in adopting 
                                                 
 144. Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), Pub. L. No. 114-95, § 1111(b), 129 Stat. 1802 (2015). 
 145. Id. § 1111(b)(1)(D) (“Each State shall demonstrate that the challenging State academic 
standards are aligned with entrance requirements for credit-bearing coursework in the system of public 
higher education in the State and relevant State career and technical education standards.”). 
 146. See Ryan, supra note 1, at 934 (concluding that the Act would incentivize states to dumb 
down their academic standards and manipulate passing rates on standardized tests). 
 147. Peterson & Hess, supra note 109, at 71–73 (finding many states had lowered their 
standards). 
 148. See Black, supra note 137, at 657–59, 663–67. 
 149. Valerie Strauss, Two More States Pull Out of Common Core, WASH. POST: ANSWER SHEET 
(June 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2014/06/05/two-more-states-
pull-out-of-common-core [https://perma.cc/ZJ6T-XZSU]; Joseph P. Williams, Who Is Fighting Against 
Common Core?, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 27, 2014), https://www.usnews.com/news/special-reports/a-guide-
to-common-core/articles/2014/02/27/who-is-fighting-against-common-core [https://perma.cc/8KQD-
45TC]; Wong, supra note 6. 
 150. ESSA § 8544. 
 151. Id. § 1111(j) (“[T]he Secretary shall not attempt to influence, incentivize, or coerce State—
(1) adoption of the Common Core State Standards developed under the Common Core State Standards 
Initiative or any other academic standards common to a significant number of States, or assessments tied 
to such standards; or (2) participation in such partnerships.”). Were that provision unclear, the Act also 
included sections reiterating the point. Id. §§ 8526, 8544. 
2017] ABANDONING THE FEDERAL ROLE IN EDUCATION 1333 
standards is not without limits: standards must be tied to the high-level goals of 
college and careers. 
One final provision reveals that the ESSA’s academic standards may tilt 
closer to the discretion of the NCLB than the rigidity of the waivers. Presumably 
wary of the heavy-handed NCLB waiver process, the ESSA provides that states 
need only provide the Department with a written assurance that their standards 
are challenging.152 States do not have to submit their academic standards to the 
Department for review.153 In this respect, states’ willingness to police themselves 
is the only real quality check on academic standards. 
B. Testing and Accountability 
The ESSA retains the NCLB’s basic testing regime, including almost the 
same exact testing development, schedule, demographic disaggregation, subject 
matter, and alignment.154 While the basic mechanics of testing development and 
administration remain the same, the ESSA dramatically changes states’ 
accountability for its test results. If “[t]est scores [we]re the fuel that ma[de] the 
NCLBA run,”155 test scores are the weight that causes the ESSA to limp. The 
ESSA reduces test scores to one factor among many that a state must consider in 
the context of pursuing the state’s self-defined goals for student progress. As a 
result, test results remain a mandatory factor, but one a state can minimize. 
Appreciating this change involves parsing out the mechanics of the ESSA. 
In devising a statewide accountability program, the ESSA requires that states 
consider student proficiency as measured by test results in all schools, graduation 
rates in high school, student growth in elementary and middle school, and 
progress in achieving English language proficiency.156 States must assign each 
of these factors “substantial weight.”157 If it stopped there, the ESSA might not 
represent a significant break from the past. However, the ESSA goes on to permit 
states to consider a host of other “school quality or student success” factors, 
including student engagement, educator engagement, student access to and 
completion of advanced coursework, postsecondary readiness, school climate 
and safety, and “any other indicator the State chooses that meets the requirements 
of this clause.”158 To be clear, the mandatory test and academic progress factors 
must count for “much greater weight” than the long list of optional factors.159 
But given the flexibility within the testing and academic progress factors, a state 
                                                 
 152. Id. § 1111(b)(1)(A) (“Each State . . . shall provide an assurance that the State has adopted 
challenging academic content standards and aligned academic achievement standards . . . .”). 
 153. Id. (noting that states “shall not be required to submit such challenging State academic 
standards to the Secretary”). 
 154. Id. § 1111(b)(2). 
 155. Ryan, supra note 1, at 940. 
 156. ESSA §§ 1111(c)(4)(B)(i)–(iv). 
 157. Id. § 1111(c)(4)(C)(ii)(I). 
 158. Id. §§ 1111(c)(4)(B)(v)(II)–(VIII). 
 159. Id. § 1111(c)(4)(C)(ii)(II). 
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could theoretically comply with the ESSA by assigning a 20 percent weight each 
to graduation rates, test scores, and English language acquisition. Collectively, 
these three factors’ weight would substantially exceed that of the other factors, 
but test scores alone would no longer play a singular role in accountability. 
Perhaps more significant than the ESSA’s de-emphasis on test results is its 
lack of accountability for those results, regardless of their state-assigned weight. 
Under the ESSA, state and local accountability for testing and other measures of 
school quality is flexible and permissive. States now have the ability to largely 
self-define the mechanics of their accountability system both in terms of the 
goals states set and the consequences schools face for failing to meet them. 
This shift manifests in three key ways. First, whereas the NCLB required 
full proficiency for all students and all schools,160 the ESSA only requires that 
states assess student proficiency. States remain free to set their own short- and 
long-term goals regarding the percentage of students who must reach 
proficiency.161 Moreover, those proficiency goals will be measured in 
conjunction with—not independent of—other factors for which the state may 
also set its own goals.162 
Second, whereas the NCLB specified interventions that states and districts 
must take when they fail to meet accountability goals, the ESSA leaves those 
decisions to state and local authorities. Rather than specify interventions, the 
ESSA requires that states and schools develop their own improvement plans.163 
Based on what the ESSA does not say, those improvement plans might be as 
broad or narrow as a state deems appropriate, so long as they involve 
“comprehensive support and improvement.”164 The ESSA does indicate that 
states must intervene in schools that fail to meet the locally developed 
improvement plan for four years.165 But again, the nature of the intervention is 
left to the states’ discretion.166 
Third, setting the forgoing limitations aside, the ESSA includes an explicit 
loophole nonexistent in the NCLB and its predecessors. No matter how rigorous 
or permissive the states’ goals and intervention strategies, the ESSA requires 
state intervention only in a small subset of schools: any school performing in the 
                                                 
 160. No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001, Pub. L. 107-100, § 1111(b)(2)(H), 115 Stat. 
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 162. Id. § 1111(c)(4). 
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fail to meet the criteria within four years. Id. § 1111(d)(3)(A)(i)(I). 
 166. The ESSA also specifies schools for targeted support and additional targeted support, but 
these designations do not amount to escalating sanctions. Id. §§ 1111(d)(2)–(3). The final step in the 
accountability regime merely indicates that a state “shall” take “more rigorous State-determined action.” 
Id. § 1111(d)(3)(A)(i)(I). 
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bottom 5 percent and high schools with graduation rates below 66 percent.167 In 
effect, while the NCLB’s interventions applied to everyone,168 the ESSA’s apply 
to almost no one. 
This shift does come with one obvious silver lining. For the schools in the 
bottom 5 percent of performance or with low graduation rates, the ESSA requires 
“evidence-based” improvement plans and interventions, assessment of school-
level needs, and identification of any resource inequities that may be contributing 
to poor performance.169 A major critique of the NCLB was that its preordained 
policy agendas were not grounded in evidence or equity.170 In contrast, ESSA 
interventions theoretically are well informed, evolve over time, and respond to 
localized needs and problems.171 This silver lining, unfortunately, is relatively 
minor given the overall trend of vast flexibility and discretion in the ESSA’s 
accountability system. 
In sum, on its face, the ESSA maintains continuity with the NCLB’s testing 
regime and seeks to correct some of the NCLB’s most glaring flaws. Yet, through 
its mechanics, the ESSA repeats the NCLB’s flaws, just through different means. 
The NCLB permitted states to manipulate academic standards and test scores, 
but mandated absolute sanctions—a tradeoff that ultimately proved insufficient 
to save the Act. In response, the ESSA slightly tightens academic standards but 
vastly reduces federal oversight of those standards and federal expectations for 
the accountability system. The net result is an opening for states to manipulate 
the system—from the standards they adopt to the schools they target. 
C. Teacher Quality 
Although the ESSA provisions on teachers are extensive, they are framed 
as a long list of activities on which schools might spend their federal teacher 
funds. Neither the NCLB’s requirement of “highly qualified”172 teachers nor the 
                                                 
 167. Id. §§ 1111(c)(4)(D)(i)(I)–(II). 
 168. NCLB §1116(b); see also Ryan, supra note 1, at 942 (“The [NCLB] requires all schools 
within a state, regardless of whether they receive Title I funding, to make adequate yearly progress.”); 
Dillon, supra note 128 (noting Secretary of Education predicted that 80 percent of schools would fail to 
meet the NCLB’s proficiency requirements in 2011). 
 169. ESSA §§ 1111(d)(1)(B)(i)–(vi). 
 170. See Beverly Cross, Teacher Quality, in APPLIED RES. CTR., REPORTING ON RACE, 
EDUCATION & NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND 41, 46–48 (2003) (citing the assumptions underlying NCLB 
and why these assumptions hinder school reform instead of helping it); Benjamin Superfine, New 
Direction in School Funding and Governance: Moving from Politics to Evidence, 98 KY. L.J. 653, 693 
(2010) (noting that most education reform has been politically motivated rather than evidence based); 
Failing Our Children Calls for NCLB Alternative, FAIRTEST, http://www.fairtest.org/failing-our-
children-calls-nclb-alternative [https://perma.cc/FSA8-G4ZQ] (finding “educational quality and equity 
have been damaged because of the law’s incorrect assumptions and arbitrary requirements”). 
 171. See generally Superfine, supra note 170, at 693 (finding that most education reform has 
been politically influenced rather than evidence based and calling for “a nuanced and deliberative 
examination of evidence” and governmental decisions “reasonable in light of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the evidence that is actually available”). 
 172. NCLB § 1119(a)(1). 
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NCLB waivers’ “effective”173 teachers language can be found in the ESSA. To 
the contrary, the ESSA now prohibits the Department from “mandat[ing], 
direct[ing], or control[ing]” any state’s teacher “evaluation system,” “definition” 
of teacher “effectiveness,” and “professional standards, certification, or 
licensing.”174 
The ESSA’s only substantive teacher requirement is that states ensure 
teachers are certified.175 However, that certification is the equivalent of the bare 
minimum to enter a classroom, not an aspirational quality standard. In this 
respect, the ESSA does no more than require states to follow the same types of 
certification processes they have followed for decades—processes that have yet 
to effectively ensure equal access to quality teaching.176 The ESSA arguably 
takes a step backward on this score. By sanctioning “alternative certification” 
and fast-track “educator preparation programs,”177 the Act, in effect, authorizes 
and encourages states to dip below traditional certification and qualification 
processes. In short, under the ESSA, a certified teacher is anyone the state 
certifies to teach. 
D. Federal Power 
From the ESSA’s testing, accountability, and teaching requirements to its 
specific limitations on the Department of Education, the ESSA represents a 
significant reduction in federal power over education. This reduction is most 
evident in regard to the Secretary of Education’s powers. The NCLB made few 
references to secretarial power; the Secretary’s power was implied in most 
instances and explicit in a few others.178 The ESSA reacts to that broad power 
and its exercise through the waiver process by specifically listing the 
circumstances—big and small—in which the Secretary has absolutely no 
                                                 
 173. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ESEA FLEXIBILITY 5 (2012), 
http://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/esea-flexibility/index.html [https://perma.cc/36Z4-UBWU]. 
 174. ESSA §§ 2101(e)(1)–(3). At most, the Act says that states are free to submit, when 
“available, the annual retention rates of effective and ineffective teachers, principals, or other school 
leaders, using any methods or criteria the State has or develops under section 1111(g)(2)(A).” Id. § 
2104(a)(4). 
 175. See id. § 1111(h)(1)(C)(ix)(III) (requiring reports on percentage of certified teachers in high-
poverty versus low-poverty schools). 
 176. Id. § 2101(c)(4)(B)(i) (allowing states to create a system for certifying teachers, but placing 
no qualitative requirements on teachers); see also id. § 9214 (providing that the term “highly qualified” 
now “mean[s] that the teacher meets applicable State certification and licensure requirements, including 
any requirements for certification obtained through alternative routes to certification”). 
 177. Id. § 2101(c)(4)(B)(xii)(II); see also Valerie Strauss, The Disturbing Provisions About 
Teacher Preparation in No Child Left Behind Rewrite, WASH. POST: ANSWER SHEET (Dec. 5, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2015/12/05/the-disturbing-provisions-about-
teacher-preparation-in-no-child-left-behind-rewrite [https://perma.cc/T2Y8-NYLX]. 
 178. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 7861(a) (2006) (granting the Secretary the authority to waive statutory 
requirements). 
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power.179 The result is a statutory framework that suggests the Secretary has no 
power unless the Act expressly provides otherwise. 
The most obvious limitations on secretarial power are regarding the plans 
states must submit to the Department describing their standards, testing, and 
accountability schemes. First, the Secretary is prohibited from reviewing or 
requesting changes to a state’s academic standards.180 As noted above, the 
Secretary’s only recourse is to require states to supply written assurances that 
their standards are challenging.181 Second, the ESSA expressly and narrowly 
limits the bases upon which the Secretary can reject a state’s plan.182 Third, even 
if the Secretary identifies one of the limited bases upon which he or she can reject 
a state plan, the Secretary must afford the state extensive processes before the 
rejection becomes effective, and the presumption is that the rejection will be 
reversed. The Secretary must: affirmatively justify the judgment that the state’s 
plan does not comply with the ESSA; allow the state a chance to respond to the 
Secretary’s assessment; if the state does not concede, offer the state a hearing to 
contest the Secretary’s judgment; and even if the Secretary prevails, the 
Secretary must still assist the state in resubmitting a new plan compliant with the 
ESSA.183 Fourth, a state plan is automatically accepted unless the Secretary 
specifically rejects it within a short time frame.184 
Finally, the ESSA emphasizes that even when the Secretary has power to 
act, the Secretary cannot place conditions on states, consider criteria outside the 
                                                 
 179. As Senator Lamar Alexander, the key architect of the Act, remarked, “I didn’t trust the 
department to follow the law. . . . Since the consensus for this bill was pretty simple—we’ll keep the 
tests, but we’ll give states flexibility on the accountability system—I wanted several very specific 
provisions in there that [limited secretarial authority]. That shouldn’t be necessary, and it’s an 
extraordinary thing to do. But for example, on Common Core, probably a half a dozen times, [ESSA 
says] . . . you cannot make a state adopt the Common Core standards. And I’m sure that if we hadn’t put 
that in there, they’d try to do it.” Klein, supra note 8. 
 180. ESSA § 1111(b)(1)(A) (“A State shall not be required to submit such challenging State 
academic standards to the Secretary.”); id. § 1111(b)(1)(G)(ii) (“The Secretary shall not have the 
authority to mandate, direct, control, coerce, or exercise any direction or supervision over any of the 
challenging State academic standards adopted or implemented by a State.”). 
 181. Id. § 1111(b)(1)(A). 
 182. Id. § 1111(a)(4)(A)(vi)(I) (indicating the Secretary can only disapprove a plan if the 
Secretary “(aa) determines how the State plan fails to meet the requirements of this section; (bb) 
immediately provides to the State, in writing, notice of such determination, and the supporting 
information and rationale to substantiate such determination; (cc) offers the State an opportunity to 
revise and resubmit its State plan, and provides the State—(AA) technical assistance to assist the State 
in meeting the requirements of this section; (BB) in writing, all peer-review comments, suggestions, 
recommendations, or concerns relating to its State plan; and (CC) a hearing, unless the State declines 
the opportunity for such hearing”). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. § 1111(a)(4)(A)(v) (providing that the Secretary shall “approve a State plan not later than 
120 days after its submission . . .”); id. § 8451 (“A plan submitted by a State pursuant to section 2101(d), 
4103(c), 4203, or 8302 shall be approved by the Secretary unless the Secretary makes a written 
determination (which shall include the supporting information and rationale supporting such 
determination), prior to the expiration of the 120-day period beginning on the date on which the 
Secretary received the plan, that the plan is not in compliance with section 2101(d), 4103(c), or 4203, or 
part C, respectively.”). 
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scope of the ESSA, or indirectly attempt to achieve any of these prohibited ends 
through policy guidance.185 The practical import here is that after limiting the 
Secretary’s front-end power to control state’s compliance plans, the ESSA just 
as carefully ensures that the Secretary does not use the typical back-end powers 
of a federal agency—statutory interpretation, waiver, and enforcement—to 
recapture the power initially withheld. Arguably adding injury to insult, the 
ESSA then directs the Secretary to take steps to reduce the size of the Department 
once it completes the initial tasks required to implement the ESSA.186 
E. Funding 
Since 1965, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act has operated 
under the assumption that states will not accept federal dictates without 
additional funding. Even with additional funding, some states have questioned 
whether the financial benefit of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
was worth the burden.187 The fact that the overall federal financial stake in 
education remains flat in the ESSA belies the fact that the ESSA reduces the 
substantive expectations for states.188 Without additional funding, the federal 
government may have found it hard to demand much from states. 
Instead of additional funding, the ESSA gives states more discretion in 
spending existing funds. For instance, the ESSA consolidates dozens of smaller 
programs into a single block grant,189 which entails fewer restrictions than other 
programmatic and formula funds.190 Similarly, the ESSA makes it easier for 
schools to use their Title I funds for “school wide programs,” eliminating many 
of the restrictions that ensure federal funds are spent only on low-income 
students.191 
The one notable exception to these funding trends is preschool education. 
Beginning in 2013, the administration began using residual Race to the Top 
                                                 
 185. 20 U.S.C. § 7861 (2012) (prohibiting the Secretary from placing conditions beyond the 
scope of the ESSA on waivers); ESSA § 1111(e)(1)(C) (prohibiting the Secretary from using “new non-
regulatory guidance” to limit state options). 
 186. ESSA § 8205. 
 187. See, e.g., Utah Set to Reject No Child Left Behind, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2005), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/feb/22/20050222-111910-7518r 
[https://perma.cc/EMR5-FMSG]. 
 188. See, e.g., Senate Appropriations Committee Approves Education Funding Bill, AFSA BLOG 
(June 10, 2016), http://www.afsaadmin.org/senate-appropriations-committee-approves-education-
funding-bill [https://perma.cc/996D-UQVW] (“Title I of ESSA only received a $500 million increase 
bringing the program total to $15.4 billion, which advocates say is not really an increase given that $450 
million for School Improvement Grants were eliminated under ESSA and lumped into the Title I 
program.”). 
 189. Orfield, supra note 7, at 285. 
 190. See generally Jason Miller, Telling Schools What to Do, Not How to Do It: Reimagining the 
Federal Government’s Role in Public Education, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 605, 610 (2014) (explaining 
the prior use of block grants in education). 
 191. ESSA § 1008. 
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funds to assist states in expanding preschool education.192 That same year, 
Secretary Duncan began pressing Congress to support universal preschool as a 
national agenda.193 Although that proposal never gained traction, the ESSA took 
a symbolic step in that direction by reserving a modest, yet secure $250 million 
funding stream for preschool education grants.194 
Congress, however, forewent the opportunity to finally fix the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act’s funding formulas and ensure that the neediest 
schools and students receive the most money. For at least the past two decades, 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act’s funding formulas have failed to 
distribute federal funds fairly.195 They are so flawed that they are, in effect, 
irrational.196 Congress seemingly acknowledged the problem when it included a 
small pilot study in the ESSA to analyze Title I’s funding formulas197 but 
nonetheless retained the deeply flawed formulas of the past.198 While the pilot 
study calls for reform proposals, it includes no mechanism for incorporating the 
study’s findings or suggestions into law; it merely requires public dissemination 
of the findings.199 The flaws and potential solutions are already widely known.200 
The missing key is the political will to act. The ESSA offers no indication of 
such will, nor initiatives likely to spur it during a future reauthorization. 
Similarly, notwithstanding longstanding critiques of gross regulatory 
loopholes, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act’s requirement of 
comparability of resources between Title I and non-Title I schools remains the 
same in the ESSA201: in effect, funding need not be comparable at all. Rather 
than address comparability, the ESSA slightly altered the maintenance of effort 
standard and the prohibition on supplanting local funds, both of which may 
actually undermine equality.202 The only notable exception from the ESSA’s 
overall ambivalence or negativity toward resource equality is its provision 
requiring that states examine resource inequities in the poorest performing 
                                                 
 192.  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP—EARLY LEARNING CHALLENGE, FY 2013 
COMPETITION, GUIDANCE AND FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS FOR APPLICANTS 3 (2013). 
 193. Arne Duncan, High-Quality Preschool Is a Sure Path to the Middle Class, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 18, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/arne-duncan-high-quality-preschool-is-a-
sure-path-to-the-middle-class/2013/04/18/9fa194ee-a629-11e2-a8e2-5b98cb59187f_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/8TQ9-TSNZ]. 
 194. ESSA § 9212(k). 
 195. Black, supra note 2, at 317–18. 
 196. Id. 
 197. ESSA § 9211. 
 198. Senator Burr introduced a last-minute amendment to the ESSA in the attempt to bring some 
immediate reform, but it did not make the final bill. This pilot study is presumably a consolation prize 
or concession. 
 199. ESSA § 9211(b)(3). 
 200. See, e.g., Superfine, supra note 170, at 693–97. 
 201. 20 U.S.C. § 6321(c)(1)(B) (2017). 
 202. Turner, supra note 19. 
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schools in the state.203 But again, this provision applies only to a small subset of 
schools and in narrow circumstances.204 
III. 
RANDOMIZING EQUALITY THROUGH STATE POWER 
The ESSA’s regulatory structure includes four fatal flaws that minimize the 
federal role in education and leave hollow the historic guarantee of equal and 
adequate educational opportunities for low-income students. First, contrary to 
the lessons of the past and current regressions in educational opportunity, the 
ESSA returns power to the states and minimizes the federal authority to demand 
progress. Second, the ESSA fails to set student performance benchmarks and 
local accountability measures, allowing states to develop fifty different schemes. 
The extent to which these schemes further equal educational opportunities 
depends on the goodwill of states and chance. Third, the ESSA fails to limit 
current patterns of gross inequality in access to resources. Fourth, the ESSA 
takes no steps—through either direct funding or regulation—to ensure that the 
outstanding needs of low-income students are met. In these respects, the ESSA 
is a self-contradictory attempt to improve low-income students’ achievement 
with no indication of the level of that achievement or provision of the resources 
for its attainment. The following Sections explore each of these points in turn. 
A. Limiting the Federal Role in Education 
1. Massive Power Shift to States 
The ESSA’s new structure amounts to an enormous devolution of power to 
states and a complete rebalancing of the federal role in education. The NCLB 
enacted a significant increase of the federal role in education, but one that 
scholars characterized as a model of cooperative federalism.205 If one were to 
assign any success to the NCLB, it might be to the ascension of the federal 
government to a leadership position the states were comfortable enough to 
accept.206 But whatever federal leadership and leverage the NCLB provided, the 
                                                 
 203. ESSA § 1111(d)(1)(B)(iv) (directing local education agencies with schools that have been 
designated for improvement to “identif[y] resource inequities, which may include a review of local 
educational agency and school-level budgeting, to be addressed through implementation of such 
comprehensive support and improvement plan”). 
 204. ESSA § 1111(d)(1)(A) (cross-referencing earlier section that specified the 5 percent lowest-
performing schools and high schools with low graduation rates). 
 205. See, e.g., Kamina Aliya Pinder, Federal Demand and Local Choice: Safeguarding the 
Notion of Federalism in Education Law and Policy, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 2 (2010) (noting that NCLB 
followed the classic paradigm of cooperative federalism); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The High Cost 
of Education Federalism, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 287, 292–93 (2013) (analyzing the cooperative 
federalism approach to education in recent decades). 
 206. See, e.g., James E. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No Child Left Behind Act and 
the Post-Desegregation Civil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1703, 1729 (2003) (highlighting the 
advantage of federal oversight in allowing for greater uniform monitoring). 
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ESSA largely eliminates it. For disadvantaged students and schools, the federal 
government’s ability to press states for equal and adequate educational 
opportunities is largely gone. 
In rejecting federal leadership, the ESSA creates a new federal-state 
relationship with states as the dominant partner. The federal government is left 
to ask for minimal assurances in exchange for substantial sums of money. The 
ESSA’s architect, Senator Lamar Alexander, states it best: short of “abolish[ing] 
the Department of Education,” the ESSA could not have done much more to 
return power to the states.207 By his estimation, the ESSA is “the most significant 
devolution of power to the states in a quarter century, certainly on education.”208 
In nearly every important aspect of the Act, federal power and discretion 
are significantly diminished and state power and discretion are extended. From 
setting academic and testing standards to assigning them weight, state decision-
making is largely beyond the purview of the Department.209 The only clear 
requirement is that states intervene in the worst-performing schools,210 but even 
then the nature and extent of that intervention is left to state discretion.211 At each 
step, the ESSA emphasizes that only under the rarest of circumstances will the 
Secretary have the authority to offer input on or reject a state’s policy on 
standards, testing, or accountability.212 The ESSA prohibits anything more than 
this as federal intrusion.213 
If the federal government has any legitimate interest in education, it is in 
the money that the federal government spends on education. Yet, even the 
ESSA’s funding policies exemplify state ascendancy. For roughly the same 
federal investment as the NCLB, the ESSA asks even less of states and offers 
even more state discretion. The ESSA does not even maintain the status quo in 
funding; it moves the Elementary and Secondary Education Act backward, 
transforming more of the existing funds into block grants.214 As a result, states 
have more freedom to use federal funds to pursue their own agendas. 
This might be defensible if the federal tradeoff was a demand for more 
equity in the areas states chose to spend the money. But the ESSA does not 
include safeguards to ensure the basic principle of equal resources for low-
                                                 
 207. Klein, supra note 8. 
 208. Id. 
 209. ESSA § 1111(b)(1)(G); Andy Smarick, Accountability and the Every Student Succeeds Act, 
THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST. (Dec. 1, 2015), https://edexcellence.net/articles/accountability-and-the-
every-student-succeeds-act [https://perma.cc/66WA-JDJ9] (characterizing the wide discretion left to the 
states). 
 210. ESSA § 1111(c)(4)(D). 
 211. Id. §§ 1111(d)(2)–(3). 
 212. Id. § 1111(a)(4)(A)(vi). 
 213. Id. 
 214. Paula Love, Every Student Succeeds Unleashes School Funding Flexibility: States and 
Districts Can Direct Block Grants to Where They Are Most Needed, DIST. ADMIN. (July 23, 2016), 
http://www.districtadministration.com/article/every-student-succeeds-unleashes-school-funding-
flexibility [https://perma.cc/B7ZZ-A3AA] (ESSA allows for “the consolidation of 49 programs under 
Title IV into a new block grant, the Student Support and Academic Enrichment Grant program”). 
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income students and schools.215 In short, the ESSA gives states something for 
nothing. It orchestrates a massive shift in substantive education policy back to 
states—a dangerous move based on states’ historical record on equal and 
adequate education.216 
2. Reasons to Be Suspicious of the New Balance of Power 
The balance of power between state and federal government has been a 
point of central concern from our country’s founding debates to recent elections 
and court decisions.217 General education policy deeply implicates this debate, 
and this Article does not purport to resolve it.218 Instead, this Article focuses on 
the narrower issue of equal educational opportunities, on which states’ track 
records are remarkably clear. States have consistently failed to offer equal 
educational opportunities. State successes are almost entirely attributable to 
federal intervention, and states have resisted that intervention at nearly every 
turn. Thus, as a matter of history, state educational power poses a threat to 
equality and, by extension, to adequacy.219 
a. States’ Historical Resistance to Racial Equality and Integration 
The most notable examples come from states’ and local districts’ long 
histories of resisting racial equality in education. The pre-Brown v. Board of 
Education era of de jure segregation speaks for itself. But for an entire decade 
following Brown, state and local school officials did next to nothing to end racial 
segregation and the unequal distribution of resources.220 Only the combination 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 
1965, and later Supreme Court decisions prompted states to begin desegregation 
and to limit other forms of discrimination.221 
                                                 
 215. Secretary King’s attempt to do so through regulatory measures generated furious complaints 
that he was acting beyond the statute. See, e.g., Nora Gordon, Why the Education Department’s New 
Equity Rule Might Not Be So Equal, ATLANTIC (June 1, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/06/why-the-education-departments-new-equity-
rule-might-not-be-so-equal/485012 [https://perma.cc/DH2R-D4WR]; Paul Hill, What’s at Stake in the 
Ongoing Fight About School Comparability?, CRPE (June 6, 2016), 
http://www.crpe.org/thelens/whats-stake-ongoing-fight-about-school-spending-comparability 
[https://perma.cc/UYQ3-YEL8]; Turner, supra note 19. 
 216. See, e.g., Hodge et al., supra note 40, at 59–60 (discussing states’ poor record on integration 
and positing that no integration would have occurred without federal intervention). 
 217. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. X; THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison); Nat’l Fed’n 
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 218. For a detailed discussion of federalism issues in education, see Robinson, supra note 205. 
 219. See, e.g., Leachman et al., supra note 12 (detailing states’ massive funding cuts in 
education); Black, supra note 13, at 431–39 (detailing new state-level policies that undermine the 
commitment to traditional public education); Hodge et al., supra note 40, at 59–60 (discussing states’ 
poor record on integration and positing that integration would not have occurred without federal 
intervention). 
 220. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 67, at 19. 
 221. See, e.g., Swann v. Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. New Kent Cty., 
391 U.S. 430 (1968); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 895 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1990). 
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Those state efforts were rarely overwhelming and, in many instances, 
nonexistent. Breaking state and local resistance took years—even decades—in 
many locations.222 Moreover, state and local predisposition for segregation and 
inequality remained strong. When judicial and federal enforcement waned in the 
late 1980s and 1990s, schools quickly reverted to old patterns, particularly in 
regard to segregation, which has risen ever since.223 
b. States’ Failure to Meet the Needs of Disadvantaged Students 
Some contend that once de jure school segregation ended, the primary focus 
should have been equal opportunity and achievement, not racial integration.224 
But on this score, states have likewise demonstrated little commitment. Prior to 
the NCLB, the vast majority of states entirely ignored achievement gaps between 
disadvantaged students and their peers.225 Because states’ expectations for 
disadvantaged students were relatively low, states saw little efficacy in exerting 
effort to boost disadvantaged students’ academic outcomes.226 According to 
President George W. Bush, the NCLB sought to counter this attitude.227 Yet, 
notwithstanding the NCLB’s demand of full proficiency for all students, many 
states still demonstrated little capacity or commitment to take the steps necessary 
to significantly improve disadvantaged students’ achievement. The more 
common response was to manipulate test scores and academic standards so as to 
                                                 
 222. See, e.g., NAACP v. Duval Cty. Sch. Bd., 273 F.3d 960 (11th Cir. 2001) (ending a case 
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761–65 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that schools lack compelling interest in remedying de 
facto segregation and focusing on predominantly minority schools where minority students achieve at 
high levels). 
 225. Daniel J. Losen, Challenging Racial Disparities: The Promise and Pitfalls of No Child Left 
Behind Act’s Race-Conscious Accountability, 47 HOW. L.J. 243, 245 (2004) (explaining that, in passing 
the NCLB, a bipartisan Congress sought to close the disparate achievement gap by “add[ing] explicitly 
race-conscious accountability requirements to Title I in order to redress severe racial disparities in 
educational achievement. The Act’s Statement of Purpose includes the following, ‘[c]losing the 
achievement gap between high and low-performing children, especially the achievement gaps between 
minority and nonminority students, and between disadvantaged and their more advantaged peers . . .’”); 
Margaret Spellings, Don’t Ignore Gains Under No Child Left Behind, TEX. TRIBUNE (Feb. 26, 2015), 
https://www.tribtalk.org/2015/02/26/dont-ignore-gains-under-no-child-left-behind 
[https://perma.cc/WT8M-VKU6 ] (“Before No Child Left Behind was enacted, too many schools had 
minimal expectations for students of color and students from disadvantaged families.”). 
 226. Spellings, supra note 225. 
 227. Id. 
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manufacture gains on paper without actually improving educational 
opportunity.228 
c. States’ Unequal and Inadequate Distribution of Resources 
Past and current state and local funding of schools exemplifies a disregard 
for disadvantaged students. Save a few rare exceptions, states have failed to 
voluntarily commit appropriate resources to the education of disadvantaged 
students. The plaintiffs in San Antonio v. Rodriguez highlighted gross unequal 
funding practices across Texas, but the Supreme Court refused to intervene, 
reasoning that the problem was beyond the authority of federal courts.229 With 
its holding, the Court left the issue to state politics and courts. Fortunately, over 
half of state courts have been receptive to claims implicating school funding,230 
but the typical response of state government has ranged from outright 
recalcitrance to malfeasance and begrudging compliance.231 In this environment, 
equal and adequate educational resources can take decades to secure232 and 
regression toward inequality and inadequacy remains a constant reality.233 
This past decade, in particular, offers numerous painful reminders. Between 
2008 and 2012, nearly every state in the country imposed large budget cuts on 
                                                 
 228. See, e.g., Carly Berwick, No Child Left Behind’s One Big Achievement?, ATLANTIC (July 
23, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/07/no-child-left-behind-one-big-
achievement/399455 [https://perma.cc/YM7Z-KBQP] (“Pre-No Child Left Behind, some advocates 
argue, special-needs students were often asked to stay home or sit the test out, because it didn’t matter 
what percentage of them participated in the assessment.”); DE MELLO, supra note 109, at 2; Peterson & 
Hess, supra note 109, at 71–73. 
 229. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4 (1973). 
 230. Derek W. Black, Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with Equal Protection: The 
First Step Toward Education as a Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1396–97 
(2010) (“Beginning in the late 1980s, however, an explosion of successful litigation regarding state 
education clauses and rights occurred . . . . In total, over half of the state supreme courts have now ruled 
in favor of plaintiffs in these cases.”). 
 231. See, e.g., Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1251 (Kan. 2014) (issuing fifth decision in five 
years and directing state to cure funding failures); Order, McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7 (Wash. Aug. 
13, 2015) (fining state for refusal to comply with school funding order). 
 232. New Jersey, for instance, has been going through school finance reform for roughly four 
decades and its supreme court has issued nearly thirty opinions. See generally Paul Tractenberg, A Tale 
of Two Deeply Divided NJ Public School Systems, NJSPOTLIGHT (Dec. 31, 2013), 
http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/13/12/30/a-tale-of-two-deeply-divided-new-jersey-public-school-
systems/?p=all [https://perma.cc/K8VG-ANBX] (describing the history of education litigation in NJ). 
 233. See generally Christopher Berry, The Impact of School Finance Judgments on State Fiscal 
Policy, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATION ADEQUACY 233 (Martin R. 
West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007). As a result of past judicial intervention, New Jersey has long had 
the most adequate and equitable funding system in the nation, but just this past summer, the state’s 
governor called for legislation that would make the state’s system one of the most inequitable and 
inadequate. See Valerie Strauss, Gov. Chris Christie Smacks New Jersey Public Schools—Right Where 
It Hurts, WASH. POST (July 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-
sheet/wp/2016/07/01/gov-chris-christie-smacks-new-jersey-public-schools-right-where-it-hurts 
[https://perma.cc/YC3V-VSVW]. 
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education.234 Some states cut more than $1,000 per pupil and in multiple years.235 
The most obvious results were teacher layoffs and pay cuts, increases to class 
size, and downgrades of teacher quality among new hires.236 The highest-need 
districts often suffered disproportionately as a result of these cuts.237 
These budget cuts cannot simply be written off as a product of the 
recession. To the contrary, states regularly enacted cuts in excess of what was 
necessary and maintained most of them after tax revenues returned to pre-
recession levels.238 States also cut traditional public school budgets at the same 
time that they were doubling funding for charters and sometimes tripling and 
quadrupling funding for vouchers.239 As of 2014, two-thirds of states were still 
                                                 
 234. NOELLE M. ELLERSON, AM. ASS’N OF SCH. ADM’RS, A CLIFF HANGER: HOW AMERICA’S 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS CONTINUE TO FEEL THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN 8 (2010) (66 percent 
of districts reported cuts to state and local revenues between 2008 and 2009, and 80 percent reported 
cuts between 2009 and 2010). 
 235. See, e.g., BAKER ET AL., supra note 27, at 8 (finding that per-pupil funding fell from over 
$10,000 to the $7,000 range in just a few years in North Carolina and Florida). 
 236. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, INVESTING IN OUR FUTURE: RETURNING TEACHERS TO 
THE CLASSROOM 1 (2012) [hereinafter INVESTING IN OUR FUTURE] (reporting a loss of three hundred 
thousand teachers); MARJORIE A. SUCKOW & ROXANN L. PURDUE, CAL. COMM’N ON TEACHER 
CREDENTIALING, TEACHER SUPPLY IN CALIFORNIA: A REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ANNUAL 
REPORT 2013–2014, at 16 (2015) (finding a 55 percent drop in the number of persons pursuing and 
completing education degrees in California); Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Challenge to Teacher 
Tenure, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 1 (2016) (describing new teacher evaluation systems and changes to 
hiring, firing, and tenure policies). 
 237. See, e.g., NICHOLAS JOHNSON, PHIL OLIFF & ERICA WILLIAMS, AN UPDATE ON STATE 
BUDGET CUTS 11 (2010); Memorandum from Jeffery C. Welch et al. to Donna Hinton on the 
Consortium for Adequate School Funding in Georgia (Jan. 29, 2009), 
https://eboard.eboardsolutions.com/Meetings/Attachment.aspx?S=4172&AID=170553 
[https://perma.cc/S3QM-LPKH]; EDUC. TR., FUNDING GAPS 2015: TOO MANY STATES STILL SPEND 
LESS ON EDUCATION STUDENTS WHO NEED THE MOST 5 (2015) (after accounting for student need); 
BAKER ET AL., supra note 27, at 9 (showing the wide funding gaps between high poverty districts and 
others). 
 238. See, e.g., Black, supra note 13, at 432–34; Patrick Gleason, North Carolina Lawmakers 
Build upon Historic Tax Reform, FORBES (June 10, 2015), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/patrickgleason/2015/06/10/nc-taxreform/#704c342b5239 
[https://perma.cc/N7VA-MNTY]; Valerie Strauss, North Carolina’s Step-by-Step War on Public 
Education, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-
sheet/wp/2015/08/07/north-carolinas-step-by-step-war-on-public-
education/?utm_term=.616cc0024651 [https://perma.cc/DP4S-F6ML]; see also Michael Leachman & 
Michael Mazerov, State Personal Income Tax Cuts: Still a Poor Strategy for Economic Growth, CTR. 
ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (May 14, 2015), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-
21-13sfp.pdf [https://perma.cc/FVP9-XW8G] (characterizing North Carolina as one of the biggest tax-
cutting states in the nation during the past five years). 
 239. See, e.g., FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., FLORIDA TAX CREDIT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FACT 
SHEET (Nov. 2015), http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/5606/urlt/FTC_Nov_2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A6D2-D5PD]; N.C. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, HIGHLIGHTS OF THE NORTH 
CAROLINA PUBLIC SCHOOL BUDGET 30 (Feb. 2015) (doubling charter school funding); Press Release, 
Educ. Law Ctr., Final NJ Budget: Charter and Private Schools Get More, No Increase for District 
Schools (July 6, 2015); Timothy J. Shrom, Solanco Sch. Dist. (PA), Presentation at the National 
Education Finance Conference (Louisville, KY): Pennsylvania Spending Patterns: A Comparison of 
Charter Schools and School District Spending by Share of Selected Functions (Apr. 2014), 
http://www.solancosd.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Spending-Patterns-Charter-and-School-
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funding education at a lower level than they did in 2008.240 Some states were a 
full 20 percent or more below the pre-recession levels.241 In short, states’ 
willingness to enact deep cuts to education and maintain them over several years 
is troubling evidence of what, at best, is ambivalence and, at worst, hostility to 
equality and adequacy. 
In sum, returning massive educational discretion to states through the 
ESSA is inconsistent with the goals of educational equality and adequacy. States 
have historically served as an impediment to attaining racial equality and 
meeting the needs of disadvantaged students. The federal government and the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act have served as important 
counterweights. In the absence of that counterbalance, history offers no basis to 
believe states will improve educational opportunities for those in need. 
Moreover, historical trends aside, the return of power to the states occurs at the 
same time states are regressing in their commitment to adequate and equal 
educational opportunities. In this context, the fact that states have welcomed the 
ESSA should be cause for alarm. 
B. Randomized Equality 
Equality concepts have remained embedded in the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act since its inception. The ESSA retains some of those 
concepts, but its current regulatory scheme drastically narrows the ways in which 
equality principles apply. The result is a regulatory regime that promotes, at best, 
random equality that really cannot be properly deemed equality at all. 
The ESSA’s random equality manifests itself in several respects: the states’ 
weighting of tests, accountability standards, and consequences for failure. These 
facets will vary from state to state, and even from district to district within a state. 
The resources that students have to meet testing, graduation, and other 
expectations will also vary considerably, with almost no limit on gross 
inequalities. The ESSA, similarly, will do almost nothing to ensure that students 
have access to adequate resources. By not demanding broad equality or adequacy 
                                                 
District-Comparison.pdf [https://perma.cc/PNB2-2KGG]; Tiara Beatty, Indiana Increases Funding for 
Charter Schools, Creates New Loan Program, EDUC. WK. (July 8, 2015), 
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/charterschoice/2015/07/indiana_increases_funding_for_charter_schoo
ls_despite_past_debt.html [https://perma.cc/3K99-VRDH]; Howard Fischer, Arizona Panel Crafting 
Changes to School Funding System, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Sept. 22, 2015), 
http://tucson.com/news/local/education/arizona-panel-crafting-changes-to-school-funding-
system/article_dc8abda4-1605-563f-8408-d16effdadc85.html [https://perma.cc/8SUZ-GS83]; Deanna 
Martin, Indiana Lawmakers Approve Nation’s Largest School Voucher Program, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Apr. 27, 201), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/20/indiana-school-voucher-
pr_n_2166293.html [https://perma.cc/5ZG3-4NC2]; Confusing Formula for Ohio Charter School 
Funding, IDEASTREAM (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.ideastream.org/stateimpact/2015/05/15/confusing-
formula-for-ohio-charter-school-funding [https://perma.cc/3GLM-PUPC]. 
 240. Leachman et al., supra note 12, at 1. 
 241. Id. 
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(in outputs or inputs), the ESSA leaves the students’ education and states’ 
expectations for what students do with that education to random chance. 
1. The Random Weight of Tests 
On its face, the ESSA retains the NCLB’s theory of standardized testing as 
a means to further equality.242 However, the NCLB’s theory of furthering equity 
and closing achievement gaps proved false, if not counterproductive.243 
Ironically, the ESSA maintains a high-level symbolic commitment to NCLB-
style testing, but puts forth an accountability scheme that makes the testing 
regime unpredictable. In other words, rather than tackle the flaws in the NCLB’s 
premises, the ESSA obscures them through randomness. 
As discussed above, under the ESSA, states have enormous flexibility in 
the amount of weight they assign to particular tests and to student achievement 
factors overall. Not only does this flexibility permit an individual state to 
minimize the weight it assigns, but it also allows every state to do something 
different.244 One state might make student proficiency tests the dominant 
measure of student achievement while another state uses student growth.245 And 
regardless of the approach a state takes, states can assign significantly different 
weights to tests and other student achievement measures. A state might, for 
instance, assign test results 95 percent in their accountability metric and any 
number of non-test factors 5 percent or less collectively.246 Another state might 
assign test results 60 percent in its accountability metric while assigning 40 
percent to softer factors, such as student engagement, teacher engagement, and 
school climate.247 With a number of options, states will have the ability to 
manipulate their accountability systems so as to produce desired outcomes.248 
                                                 
 242. Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), Pub. L. No. 114-95, §§ 1111(b)(2), (c), 129 Stat. 1802 
(2015) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311(b)(2), (c)). 
 243. See generally NAOMI CHUDOWSKY & VIV CHUDOWSKY, CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y, MANY 
STATES HAVE TAKEN A “BACKLOADED” APPROACH TO NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND GOAL OF ALL 
STUDENTS SCORING “PROFICIENT” (2008) (explaining how states set low achievement goals for 
themselves in the early years of implementing the Act); SHELBY DIETZ & MALINI ROY, CTR. ON EDUC. 
POL’Y, HOW MANY SCHOOLS HAVE NOT MADE ADEQUATE YEARLY PROGRESS UNDER THE NO 
CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT? (2010) (detailing the widespread failure to comply with the Act’s mandates). 
 244. ESSA §§ 1111(c)(4)(B)(v), (4)(C)(ii)(II) (affording “in the aggregate, much greater weight 
[to the optional indicators] than is afforded to the [required] indicator or indicators utilized by the State”). 
 245. To be clear, these are entirely different ways of measuring student learning. Proficiency asks 
whether a student possesses basic knowledge and skills, whereas growth asks how much progress a 
student makes over the course of a year, regardless of whether the student is proficient. See LISA 
LACHLAN-HACHÉ & MARINA CASTRO, AM. INSTS. FOR RES., PROFICIENCY OR GROWTH? AN 
EXPLORATION OF TWO APPROACHES FOR WRITING STUDENT LEARNING TARGETS (2015), 
http://www.air.org/sites/default/files/Exploration-of-Two-Approaches-Student-Learning-Targets-
April-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/MNF4-9YEG]. 
 246. ESSA § 1111(c)(4)(B)(v). 
 247. See id. (permitting optional indicators); id. at § 1111(c)(4)(C)(ii)(II) (stating that the required 
indicators receive “much greater weight” than the optional indicators). 
 248. As an early analysis of California’s new ESSA system found, 
Nearly 80% of schools serving grades three through eight are ranked as medium- to high-
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None of the foregoing is meant to suggest that testing is an effective means 
to promote equal education opportunity or that some optimum weight should be 
afforded to test results. The point here is that the ESSA maintains the NCLB’s 
notion that there is merit to testing and accountability, but undermines its own 
premise. If testing and accountability are plausible tools for achieving equality, 
leaving states’ testing regimes to random variability undermines equality. Rather 
than tracking a single proficiency standard as in the NCLB, the ESSA affords 
disadvantaged students educational opportunities that more closely track the 
approach of their home state rather than any mandate in statute. In this respect, 
the ESSA does little to continue the Elementary and Secondary Education Act’s 
historic mission to promote improvements in academic achievement for 
disadvantaged students. 
2. Limited Accountability 
The ESSA compounds this testing flexibility problem with its permissive 
approach to states’ obligation to assist struggling schools and students. The vast 
majority of low-performing schools and students will fly well under the ESSA’s 
regulatory radar, and those who do not may believe they have been randomly 
targeted. State intervention pursuant to the ESSA will be more akin to a lightning 
strike than a predictable consequence of a well-designed accountability 
scheme.249 
                                                 
performing in the new ratings, earning them positive colors on report cards sent to parents. 
Last year in state testing at those same schools, the majority of students failed to reach English 
and math standards. More than 50 of those schools whose average math scores fell below 
proficiency receive the dashboard’s highest rating for math. 
Joy Resmovits & Sandra Poindexter, California’s New Education Ratings Tool Paints a Far Rosier 
Picture Than in the Past, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-
california-dashboard-ratings-20170316-story.html [https://perma.cc/2ZDN-MHPM]. At the same time, 
Maryland was considering legislation that would severely restrict the weight the State Board of 
Education could place on student achievement. Maryland lawmakers suggested several restrictions, 
including: 
limiting measures of actual school effectiveness (student achievement, student growth and 
graduation) to 55 percent of a school’s accountability rating, in favor of factors such as 
teacher satisfaction; . . . and barring the state from taking significant actions to reform the 
worst-performing schools, even after districts have had years to set them straight. 




 249. This metaphor draws upon the Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence. In Furman v. 
Georgia, the Court struck down the penalty, reasoning that: 
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning 
is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, 
many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random 
handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed . . . I simply conclude 
that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of 
death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly 
imposed. 
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The complex and multifactor achievement weighing systems that states 
adopt will make it hard to predict where any given school falls in the system 
from year to year. More importantly, only a very small fraction of schools—
those in the bottom 5 percent in achievement or with graduations rates below 66 
percent—will actually be subject to sanctions.250 Consistently poor performance 
in the bottom 25 percent of schools in the state would not make the odds of 
sanctions predictable or likely. Even a school that was in the bottom 5 percent 
one year could easily fall outside of it the next. 
Some would argue that minimizing sanctions is the very point, as the NCLB 
foolishly punished too many schools.251 That point has merit. The majority of 
our schools and students perform at levels as high as any others in the world.252 
The NCLB incorrectly labeled many of them as failures and targeted them for 
reform. The ESSA wildly overcorrects this problem, replacing a regulatory 
system that treated nearly all schools as failures with a system that treats almost 
all as de facto successes. In effect, the ESSA holds almost no schools 
accountable. Herein lies the problem. 
Regardless of which schools ultimately fall into the group that receives 
intervention and support, the hard truth is that schools outside that group can 
continue their current practices, even if that means doing a poor job educating 
their students.253 Whether a student in a given state or school receives ESSA 
intervention and support depends not on whether the school is offering adequate 
or equal education, but on whether the student attends a school randomly 
identified by the state’s performance weighting system. Moreover, a school 
randomly slated for improvement in one state’s weighting system could just as 
easily receive no support if another state’s system applied. 
3. Unchecked Resource Inequality 
The randomized guarantee of output equality might be mitigated or cured 
if instead the ESSA’s goal was to ensure equal inputs and resources. Equal inputs 
are easier to achieve than equal outputs. Equal inputs, if implemented properly, 
may also be a better indicator of equal educational opportunity than raw 
outcomes.254 An initial premise of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
was exactly that—to provide supplemental resources to disadvantaged students 
                                                 
408 U.S. 238, 309–10 (1972). While it is possible that a state could create an education system with 
predictable results, the ESSA does not require it. Instead, it allows for a very complex and unpredictable 
system. See infra notes 250–53 and accompanying text. 
 250. ESSA § 1111(c)(4)(D). 
 251. See Dillon, supra note 128 (indicating that 80 percent of schools were set to be labeled as 
failing). 
 252. See LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, THE FLAT WORLD AND EDUCATION: HOW AMERICA’S 
COMMITMENT TO EQUITY WILL DETERMINE OUR FUTURE 11–13 (2010) (revealing that whites, Asian-
Americans, and multi-racial students, for instance, perform well above international levels). 
 253. See generally Smarick, supra note 209 (“If your primary interest is in getting Uncle Sam to 
back off of America’s schools, you can start to prepare the Mission Accomplished banner.”). 
 254. See generally Rebell, supra note 83. 
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to bring their educational outcomes closer to that of their peers.255 The ESSA 
drifts further away from this focus on inputs. In conjunction with the prior 
Section, this means that the ESSA assures equality in neither inputs nor outputs. 
Some of the fault lies with historical holdovers. The Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act has long contained a provision requiring comparable 
resources between Title I and non-Title I schools. In practice, however, nothing 
of the sort has been required in recent decades. During the early 1970s, the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act and its implementing regulations 
required that expenditures at Title I schools be within 5 percent of the 
expenditures at other schools within their district.256 That number was later 
changed to 10 percent and eventually abandoned altogether.257 
In place of numerical measures of equality, recent versions of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act have required that Title I schools 
merely be “substantially comparable” to other schools in the district, based on 
school services “as a whole.”258 This vague and forgiving standard has not 
required meaningful equity between schools for some time. In addition, the 
comparability requirement does not apply across district lines, even though the 
largest funding inequalities exist between school districts. The Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act has never purported to address interdistrict inequality 
and the ESSA does nothing to change this or any other significant equity 
demand. Instead, the ESSA retains the blunt statutory provision that “[n]othing 
in this subchapter shall be construed to mandate equalized spending per pupil for 
a State, local educational agency, or school.”259 
Embedded in these weak equity standards is an even bigger and more 
troubling loophole for teacher salaries. Teacher salaries regularly comprise 80 to 
90 percent of school budgets.260 In the past few iterations of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act, schools’ total expenditures for teacher salaries have 
been exempted from analysis. Rather than examine salary expenditures, the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act has asked two questions: (1) whether 
there is a uniform salary schedule across the district, and (2) whether staffing 
ratios are roughly similar. In other words, so long as schools have similar 
student-teacher ratios and all first-year teachers, for instance, are equally 
compensated, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act treats the schools as 
substantially comparable. 
This standard completely ignores the fact that the teaching staffs at schools 
often look entirely different in terms of quality. Under the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act, a district could assign all first-year teachers to a high-
poverty school and all teachers with advanced degrees, national certifications, 
                                                 
 255. JEFFREY, supra note 22. 
 256. 45 C.F.R. § 116.26 (1972); 45 C.F.R. §116a.26 (1977). 
 257. 45 C.F.R. § 116 (1978). 
 258. 20 U.S.C. § 6321(c)(1)(B) (2006). 
 259. Id. § 6576. 
 260. Id. § 6321(c)(2)(B). 
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and several years of experience to a school serving predominantly middle-
income students. This alone would likely create not only a huge quality gap 
between schools but also a huge funding gap. A uniform salary schedule that 
dictates much higher salaries for highly credentialed teachers would net 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in additional expenditures at the middle-income 
school. Yet, under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act’s weak equity 
standards and teacher loophole, this quality and funding gap is entirely 
permissible. 
Data reveals that districts regularly exploit this loophole. Schools serving 
large percentages of low-income and minority students are wildly unequal in 
their ability to attract, compensate, and retain quality teachers.261 On average, 
poor and minority students are exposed to inexperienced, uncredentialed, and 
unqualified teachers at twice the rate as other students.262 The financial 
consequences of this unequal distribution follow automatically. The Department 
of Education indicates that in districts with twenty or more schools, 72 percent 
of school districts spend less on teacher salaries in Title I schools than in non-
Title I schools in the district, with an average gap of over $2,500 per teacher.263 
A separate study found that states and local districts would need to allocate $6.83 
billion nationally to close the funding gap created by teacher salaries.264 
That the ESSA continues these lax equity standards and loopholes is 
remarkable. Scholars, policy reports, the media, the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, and even the Department of Education itself have 
emphasized how ineffectual the Elementary and Secondary Education Act has 
been in ensuring equal treatment in school expenditures in recent years.265 
Secretary John King recently remarked, “The current system is not fair. . . . 
‘What we see, as we look around the country, is districts where they’re actually 
spending significantly more in their non-Title I schools than they’re spending in 
                                                 
 261. Charles Clotfelter et al., High-Poverty Schools and the Distribution of Teachers and 
Principals, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1372–73 (2007); BARNETT BERRY & ERIC HIRSCH, RECRUITING 
AND RETAINING TEACHERS FOR HARD-TO-STAFF SCHOOLS (2005) (identifying recruitment and 
retention problems in high-poverty, low-performing schools); ERICA FRANKENBERG, THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV., THE SEGREGATION OF AMERICAN TEACHERS 25–26 (2006) 
(revealing that teacher dissatisfaction tends to rise as the percentage of minority students in a school 
rises, increasing likelihood that teachers will leave). 
 262. See HEATHER G. PESKE & KATI HAYCOCK, TEACHING INEQUALITY: HOW POOR AND 
MINORITY STUDENTS ARE SHORTCHANGED ON TEACHER QUALITY 2–3 (2006). 
 263. Nat Malkus, The Title I Funding Fight, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 26, 2016), 
https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-04-26/obamas-education-department-overreach-wont-
equalize-title-i-funding [https://perma.cc/6VLS-ETMC] (discussing federal data). 
 264. ARY SPATIG-AMERIKANER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, UNEQUAL EDUCATION: FEDERAL 
LOOPHOLE ENABLES LOWER SPENDING ON STUDENTS OF COLOR 21 (2012). 
 265. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FINAL MANAGEMENT 
INFORMATION REPORT: MONITORING OF THE TITLE I, PART A, COMPARABILITY OF SERVICES 
REQUIREMENT 2 (2007); Black, supra note 2, at 355–59; Marguerite Roza, The Education Trust, How 
Districts Shortchange Low-Income and Minority Students, in FUNDING GAPS 2006, supra note 31, at 9–
11 (2006); Ross Wiener, Strengthening Comparability: Advancing Equity in Public Education, in 
ENSURING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 2, at 40. 
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their Title I schools.’”266 A host of studies also demonstrate that access to quality 
teachers may have the largest impact on student achievement of any factor.267 
For that reason, the Department of Education recently emphasized that unequal 
access to teachers may violate Title VI’s prohibition on racial discrimination.268 
Yet, the ESSA ignored both issues of funding and teacher inequalities. 
In some respects, the ESSA asks even less than the NCLB in regard to 
equity. The ESSA relaxes both the maintenance of effort standard and the 
prohibition on supplanting local funds.269 Weakening these standards makes it 
easier for districts to mask their unequal funding practices. With fewer limits on 
how federal dollars are spent, districts can use federal dollars to fill the local 
funding deficits that districts create through their own fiscal policies.270 Districts 
might even expand funding inequalities and deficits in local expenditures 
because they have more flexibility with federal funds. As Part III.C will detail, 
Secretary King sought to block this eventuality through regulation but faced 
congressional rebuke for doing so.271 
The one potential exception to the ESSA’s disregard for equity is its set of 
requirements for schools in the bottom 5 percent of a state’s performance metric. 
The ESSA requires that districts examine resource inequities in those schools to 
determine whether they contribute to the school’s poor performance.272 While an 
improvement upon the NCLB, this measure is extremely limited. The provision 
only applies to inequities between schools in an individual district even though 
the most significant resource inequities exist between districts.273 For instance, a 
2015 study found that half of the nation’s states funded education at a lower level 
in districts serving predominantly low-income students than in other districts—
and the gap was often shocking.274 In Nevada, for example, expenditures in high-
need districts were only 48 percent of those in low-need districts.275 The ESSA 
ignores this inequality, notwithstanding its well-documented prevalence. 
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 271. Turner, supra note 19. 
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Even if resource inequality were only a problem within districts, this new 
ESSA provision would do little to address it because it applies to such a small 
subset of schools. Equally problematic, the provision does not actually require 
that districts close the inequities they find; it only requires they assess them.276 
Thus, the ESSA does not mandate a remedy for serious resource inequalities, 
even when districts find them. In short, this new provision ignores the most 
glaring problem of inter-district resource inequity and focuses instead on the 
smaller problem of intra-district inequity. But even then, it does no more than 
occasionally ask that a few districts consider the problem. 
4. Unaddressed Student Needs 
Certain levels of inequity might be tolerable if states guaranteed minimum 
resource levels that ensured all students still received a quality education. 
Arguably, the important question is whether districts serving predominantly low-
income students have the resources they need, not whether suburban schools 
outspend them. Data suggests, however, that states’ funding practices are just as 
problematic in terms of adequacy as they are in terms of equity. Yet, the ESSA 
neither prohibits these practices, nor supplies the federal resources necessary to 
meet student needs when states cannot or will not. 
All relevant data points indicate that student need has risen and is not being 
met. The number and percentage of poor students and other special-need 
populations attending public school have increased in recent years.277 But over 
the past decade, states’ ability or willingness to meet student need has declined. 
As detailed above, states are funding education at significantly lower levels than 
just a few years ago, and the districts hurt the most are often those with high 
concentrations of student poverty.278 Cuts were so deep and sustained over the 
past decade that social science suggests the result will be long-term achievement 
deficits for students who attended school during this period.279 
NCLB waivers cut short any check the NCLB testing regime might have 
placed on this academic outcome,280 and no other aspect of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act placed any meaningful limit on resource adequacy 
                                                 
 276. ESSA § 1111(d)(1)(B)(iv). 
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concerns.281 Against this backdrop, Congress had every reason to include 
adequacy metrics in the ESSA, but it did nothing.282 The other—and politically 
easier—option would have been for the ESSA to fund more basic resources. In 
fact, as part of the economic stimulus package, the federal government had done 
just that during the first years of the recession, giving the states funds to prevent 
massive teacher layoffs and budget shortfalls.283 
The ESSA, however, did almost nothing to ensure adequacy moving 
forward. First, whereas the NCLB substantially increased federal funding for 
low-income students, the ESSA leaves funding flat. Second, the ESSA does 
nothing to improve the way existing funds target student need. Instead, the ESSA 
continues a pattern of distributing federal funds by happenstance. This 
happenstance distribution is a product of ill-conceived weights in the funding 
formula for district size, states with small student populations, and poverty 
concentrations.284 Some of these factors counteract one another and others are 
simply based on false assumptions.285 The overly broad distribution of federal 
funds is a product of the fact that a district only needs 2 percent poverty to receive 
Title I funds, a threshold that nearly every district in the nation meets.286 
As a result of the formulas, federal funds that might otherwise meet the 
need of high-poverty districts go to predominantly middle-income and wealthy 
districts. A recent study found that “20 percent of all Title I money for poor 
students—$2.6 billion—ends up in school districts with a higher proportion of 
wealthy families.”287 For instance, the “Montgomery County Schools in 
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Maryland, an[] elite suburb outside Washington, get nearly $26 million [in Title 
I funding], despite a child poverty rate of 8.4 percent.”288 Moreover, the average 
per-pupil Title I allotment for wealthier districts is larger than that of schools 
with the highest poverty levels.289 A similar phenomenon occurs across state 
lines, with the wealthiest states receiving the largest per-pupil grants.290 
5. Incoherence of Retreating on Both Inputs and Outputs 
Underlying the ESSA’s flat and random funding, on the one hand, and its 
permissive accountability standards, on the other, is a deeply conflicted set of 
premises that reveal how unpredictable equality will be under the ESSA. The 
ESSA’s highest-level premise is that outcome equality can be achieved without 
input equality, which is problematic in itself. The ESSA pushes that premise to 
the extreme in several respects. First, the ESSA offers no clear definition of 
outcome equality.291 Thus, if output equality is the goal, it is a goal without 
meaningful parameters. A more forgiving reading of the Act suggests that the 
ESSA offers a rough outline for states to define equal outcomes themselves, but 
such an outline would still be of little import given the next point. 
Second, regardless of how the ESSA defines equality, it lacks mechanisms 
to achieve equality on a broad scale. The Act requires states to set academic 
standards and goals, but the Act’s accountability system reveals that most 
schools need not meet them. Save the exceptional few, schools that fail to meet 
these goals will not suffer any consequences and will not be expected to take any 
corrective action. Even among those that must act, the ESSA takes few positions 
on what that action should be.292 In these respects, the ESSA’s accountability 
system is more akin to a monitoring system that, at best, picks out a small subset 
of schools for further scrutiny and assumes that monitoring outcomes alone will 
further equality. But given that the NCLB demonstrated that even strict 
accountability for all schools was insufficient to achieve equal outcomes,293 the 
ESSA’s premise of monitoring outcomes to further equality is wishful thinking. 
Third, the ESSA’s willingness to largely ignore input equality and 
adequacy assumes that inputs are of limited relevance to student outcomes. The 
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precise connection between inputs and outcomes is surely complex and subject 
to disagreement, but courts and scholars consistently agree that spending money 
wisely matters to education outcomes.294 A 1996 review of all relevant school 
funding studies found that per-pupil expenditures “show strong and consistent 
relations with achievement. . . . In addition, resource variables that attempt to 
describe the quality of teachers (teacher ability, teacher education, and teacher 
experience) show very strong relations with student achievement.”295 The 
precise effect of funding may differ based on how funds are allocated, but “a 
broad range of resources [are] positively related to student outcomes, with effect 
sizes large enough to suggest that moderate increases in spending may be 
associated with significant increases in achievement.”296 Recent studies have 
confirmed these findings.297 Most notably, based on three decades of data, a 2016 
study found that a 20 percent increase in per-pupil funding, if maintained over 
time, results in low-income students completing almost a full additional year of 
education.298 That additional learning eliminates two-thirds of the gap in 
outcomes between low- and middle-income students.299 
At worst, the ESSA’s failure to address resource inequity is a rejection of 
this body of research. At best, the ESSA concedes the importance of resources 
but unrealistically hopes that states will voluntarily address adequacy and equity 
problems. If the NCLB’s rigid accountability did not prompt states to address 
funding problems, there is little reason to believe the ESSA’s minimal 
accountability system will prompt a better result. In effect, leaving resource 
equity and adequacy to voluntary state action is to abandon resource equity and 
adequacy, even if the ESSA does not explicitly state as much. 
The abandonment of federal leadership on both inputs and outputs turns the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act on its historical head. The Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act was originally enacted and, for decades, 
maintained on the notion that certain communities and states would not do what 
is necessary to provide appropriate educational opportunities for disadvantaged 
students.300 The ESSA contradicts this mission and premise by placing near-
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complete responsibility for equitable and adequate inputs and outputs in the 
hands of state and local actors. Either the initial premise or the ESSA’s current 
implementation is incorrect. If the former, one must question whether a 
justification for continuing the Elementary and Secondary Education Act exists. 
If the latter, one must question whether the ESSA is a legitimate extension of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act and, if not, what independent 
justifications exist for the ESSA. 
In sum, the ESSA rests on flawed premises regardless of how one conceives 
the Act. As a continuation of the NCLB’s testing and accountability regime, the 
ESSA is flawed because its outcome expectations are far weaker than those in 
the NCLB. If the ESSA is an equity and adequacy input measure, it is flawed 
because it includes neither federal funding to further those ends, nor any 
obligation for states to do so themselves. Over its history, the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act has vacillated between input- and output-based 
frameworks for equal educational opportunity for disadvantaged students,301 but 
not until the ESSA has it effectively abandoned both. 
C. Administrative Enforcement as a Safety Valve 
1. Limits on Equity Enforcement 
John King was the Secretary of Education when the ESSA became law. To 
his credit, Secretary King recognized some of the ESSA’s equity gaps and 
quickly sought to close them. He primarily was concerned that states and local 
districts underfund their Title I schools and unequally distribute teachers. 
Because the ESSA’s precise statutory text does little to cure these problems, 
Secretary King has proposed steps to leverage the regulatory process to close 
some of the ESSA’s loopholes.302 Under the ESSA, states must submit their 
testing and accountability plans to the Department of Education for approval.303 
Secretary King indicated that he planned to require that those plans also address 
funding inequalities.304 
More specifically, the Department proposed regulations that would use the 
statutory prohibition on supplanting local funds as a resource equity guarantee.305 
To justify this bold move, the Department pointed to the contradiction between 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act’s historical mission and current 
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practices.306 In a notice of proposed rulemaking, the Department emphasized that 
the explicit “purpose of Title I of the ESSA is to ‘provide all children significant 
opportunity to receive a fair, equitable, and high-quality education, and to close 
educational achievement gaps.’”307 It reasoned that the supplement-not-supplant 
provisions are an extension of this purpose, designed as a mechanism “to ensure 
that the Federal resources are spent to provide the additional educational 
resources and supports that at-risk students need to succeed, instead of being 
used to simply make up for unfair shortfalls in State and local funding.”308 
Absent a limitation on states and localities distributing their own funds 
unequally, Title I cannot provide the extra help disadvantaged students need.309 
In fact, “two-thirds of students attend school where fewer State and local dollars 
are spent per pupil in Title I schools than in non-Title I schools.”310 
The ESSA combined two separate, older “supplement, not supplant” 
statutory provisions into one new provision that requires states and districts to 
“demonstrate that the methodology used to allocate State and local funds to each 
[Title I school] ensures that such school receives all of the State and local funds 
it would otherwise receive if it were not receiving assistance under [Title I].”311 
As part of the methodology review process, King proposed to require districts to 
show they are “spending an amount of state and local funds per pupil in each 
Title I-A school that is equal to or greater than the average amount spent per 
pupil in non-Title I-A schools.”312 
As a matter of general substance, King’s proposal is appealing. It would 
reasonably ensure that federal funds are not supplanting local funds and would 
address a number of this Article’s equity concerns. Nonetheless, King’s proposal 
appears inconsistent with the ESSA on several levels: the narrowed scope of the 
Secretary’s powers, the general disregard for meaningful equity, and the specific 
statutory language. Thus, it was no surprise that King’s proposed use of 
administrative power alarmed Congress. 
Senator Lamar Alexander, the principal author of the ESSA, called a 
hearing to challenge Secretary King’s proposal. He called the proposal an 
“intolerable” attempt to backdoor a stringent comparability standard into the Act 
through the entirely distinct supplement-not-supplant standard.313 According to 
Alexander, the ESSA is clear on comparability: “teacher salaries may not be 
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included in [the comparability] computation.”314 Thus, he argued, King’s attempt 
to include teacher salaries and funding comparability in supplement-not-supplant 
regulations is so far out of line that states “should [not] follow them” and “[i]f 
the department persists, then the state should go to court to sue the 
department.”315 
A number of outside analysts and groups, including the nonpartisan 
Congressional Research Service (CRS), have reached the same conclusion.316 
The CRS’s detailed analysis pointed out that the proposed regulation goes 
beyond the “plain language” and requirements of the supplement-not-supplant 
provision, is inconsistent with current and past legislative history, and “directly 
conflict[s]” with other statutory provisions designed to limit funding 
comparability analysis.317 Thus, the CRS concluded that the regulation was 
likely illegal.318 Facing legal uncertainty and growing political opposition, 
Secretary King eventually withdrew his proposed regulation. 
In sum, King’s proposal was well-intentioned but most likely beyond his 
power. While states’ funding for Title I schools is $7 billion less than other 
schools, and federal dollars do no more than backfill this gap, the ESSA does 
nothing to stop it. To the contrary, the ESSA prohibits the Secretary from 
intervening. This stark reality best underscores the overall weaknesses and flaws 
of the ESSA: by its scope and precise provisions, the ESSA blocks the Secretary 
from using otherwise reasonable tools to further the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act’s historical equity mission. 
This point also reinforces just how little power the Secretary has to do 
anything of substance now. The ESSA is not a watered-down, ambiguous 
framework that this administration or subsequent ones can mold through the 
administrative process. States, not the Department, wield the ESSA’s flexibility. 
This means that the ESSA will produce the equality only that states randomly or 
voluntarily offer. The most likely result is a continuation of the current status 
quo of inequality, if not further retrenchment. 
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2. Limits on Policy Positions in General 
Initial policy statements from the new Secretary of Education, Betsy 
DeVos, also demonstrate the precariousness of the federal role in education 
under the ESSA and the unlikelihood that enforcement measures will cure it. In 
the weeks preceding her confirmation, she articulated her major policy goals: 
return decision-making authority to the states, end the Common Core standards, 
and increase school choice in the form of charter schools and vouchers.319 The 
ESSA, however, has already achieved her first goal, making Secretary DeVos’s 
position on state authority largely irrelevant. And by returning authority to the 
states, the ESSA rendered DeVos’s other goals beyond her power.320 
The Secretary lacks the authority to promote or undermine the Common 
Core standards.321 States are simply free to adopt or not adopt the standards as 
they see fit. Despite the controversy surrounding the Common Core standards,322 
roughly three-quarters of states have retained them.323 Likewise, states are 
entirely free to use charter schools and vouchers to improve educational quality 
in their low-performing schools, but they are equally free to adopt countless other 
evidence-based approaches.324 Thus, Secretary DeVos cannot pressure states to 
adopt any particular reform. In other words, the efficacy of the Secretary’s 
agenda is beside the point. Even if the agenda included adequacy and equity, the 
ESSA would severely constrain that agenda because it constrains the federal role 
in education. 
As soon as Secretary DeVos took office, these constrained powers posed 
serious problems for federal leadership. On February 10, 2017, DeVos sent a 
letter to states indicating that the timeline for submitting their ESSA 
accountability plans would remain in place, but that the Department was pausing 
implementation of regulations that the prior administration passed in November 
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2016.325 Putting aside the wisdom and legality of this pause,326 it would leave the 
ESSA with no implementing regulations.327 States would be left with no 
guidance other than the text of the ESSA and the immense discretion it affords 
them. In the absence of new regulation, almost any plan a state submits will be 
approved. The ESSA gives the Secretary only 120 days to accept or reject a state 
plan.328 After that time, the ESSA deems the plan automatically approved.329 In 
theory, this could include plans that do not even meet the text of the ESSA 
itself.330 In short, the ESSA strips the Secretary of important powers and, even 
when it does not, the ESSA defers entirely to the states unless the Secretary acts 
quickly and affirmatively. 
IV. 
ENSURING EQUALITY AND ADEQUACY THROUGH THE ELEMENTARY AND 
SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT 
Simply repealing the ESSA is no more realistic than was repealing the 
NCLB. Unless Congress is willing to eliminate federal funding for schools 
altogether, some other federal structure must take its place. Given that the ESSA 
is so new, it is unlikely that Congress would substantially amend it in the next 
year.331 But the ESSA, by its own terms, is set to expire in four years. At that 
point, the fervor to eliminate the NCLB at any cost will have subsided, making 
deliberations over meaningful legislation possible once again. 
Congress can then realign the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
with its historic mission of improving academic achievement and equity for low-
income students, and also can enact better mechanisms to achieve those goals. 
First, Congress must increase the federal investment in education. This is 
                                                 
 325. Letter from Betsy Devos, Secretary of Education, to Chief State School Officer (Feb. 10, 
2017), https://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/02102017-essa-letter.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/95WV-X5DL]. 
 326. See generally MAEVE P. CAREY, ALISSA M. DOLAN & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2016), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43992.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BMY-PPBB] (providing an overview of the 
legality of pausing or repealing regulations). 
 327. Secretary DeVos sent the letter on the premise that Congress might repeal the prior 
administration’s regulations pursuant to the Congressional Review Act. Congress did just that as this 
Article neared publication. Dana Goldstein, Obama Education Rules Are Swept Aside, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/us/every-student-succeeds-act-essa-
congress.html [https://perma.cc/65BR-AQGN]. 
 328. ESSA § 1111(a)(4)(A)(v) (stating the Secretary shall “approve a State plan not later than 
120 days after its submission”); id. § 8451 (indicating a plan is approved after 120 days unless the 
Secretary affirmatively finds that it fails to meet statutory requirements). 
 329. Id. § 8451. 
 330. See, e.g., Derek Black, It’s a Terrible Time to Be Secretary of Education, Especially If You 
Don’t Understand the Job, EDUC. LAW PROF BLOG, Feb. 20, 2017, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/education_law/2017/02/its-a-terrible-time-to-be-secretary-of-
education-especially-if-you-dont-understand-the-job.html [https://perma.cc/8PVD-AXZ6]. 
 331. The chance of minor improvements, however, is always possible. Congress quickly 
amended the teacher quality requirements of the NCLB once it became clear states could not meet them. 
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necessary to help states meet the full academic needs of disadvantaged students 
and to offset the proportionally higher costs of districts serving predominantly 
low-income students. An increase in federal investment is also necessary if states 
are to accept the second step: strict prohibitions on states’ unequal distribution 
of educational resources. Strict prohibitions with no transition steps, however, 
would surely fail. Thus, Congress should require incremental steps toward 
equity, as well as alternative compliance measures for districts that might be high 
performing regardless of their resources. The final step is to expand preschool 
education to all low-income students—a goal that the Department of Education 
has pushed in recent years, but that states seemingly lack the capacity to reach 
alone. A short-term federal investment could immediately expand preschool and, 
in the long term, generate new savings that states could use to fund preschool 
and offset the costs of equity compliance in later grades. The following Sections 
explore each of these points in full. 
A. Increase the Federal Investment in Education 
The federal financial stake in education should substantially increase and 
move states toward delivering low-income students the full supplemental 
funding necessary to provide adequate educational opportunities. Estimates 
suggest that for low-income students to achieve at levels comparable to their 
peers, they require 30 to 60 percent more resources than those necessary for 
middle-income students.332 The federal government has officially pegged 40 
percent as the appropriate supplement.333 States are far from meeting this 
standard and, as Part III.A demonstrates, are regressing in many locations. 
Skeptics primarily ask why the federal government should take on a larger 
financial commitment in an area traditionally of state concern and control. And 
relatedly, why not simply demand that states meet appropriate resource goals 
themselves? The answer to these concerns is threefold. First, some states appear 
to lack the resources to fund education adequately and equitably.334 Ironically, a 
few states fund education roughly equally across districts, but the actual funding 
level itself is relatively low.335 These states lag far behind the national average 
                                                 
 332. Black, supra note 2, at 341–42; Wiener & Pristoop, supra note 31, at 6 (stating that Goodwin 
Liu uses a 60 percent adjustment for poor children, while the authors use a 40 percent adjustment). 
 333. No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001, Pub. L. 107-100, §§ 1124, 1125A, 115 Stat. 
1425 (2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6333, 6337 (2006)) (setting the standard for whether low-income 
schools are fairly funded as whether they receive a 40 percent funding increase adjustment); NAT’L CTR. 
FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PUBLIC SCHOOL REVENUE SOURCES (2016), 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cma.asp [https://perma.cc/YWY5-B5LQ] (identifying 40 
percent as the appropriate adjustment for low-income students); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra 
note 31, at 30 (defining “inner city” as an area with a poverty rate of 40 percent or higher). 
 334. See Liu, supra note 41, 983–84. 
 335. For instance, Tennessee has a progressive funding formula, but the actual amount of funds 
the state devotes to education and the effort it exerts to raise those funds are among the worst in the 
nation. BAKER ET AL., supra note 27, at 24–25. 
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in terms of fiscal capacity.336 They devote a greater percentage of their states’ 
overall wealth to education, but because they are poor states, their extra effort 
still generates relatively low levels of education funding.337 As one study found, 
the greatest funding inequities are between poor and rich states, not within 
individual states.338 
Second, many states with relatively high fiscal capacity have taken very 
little initiative in equalizing education.339 These states may fund education at 
relatively high levels, but funding can be wildly unequal across districts. In other 
words, many states fall into two different camps: one with a commitment to 
equity but no capacity for adequacy, and another with the capacity for adequacy 
but no commitment to equity. As Josh Weishart explained, adequacy and equity 
are interconnected, and one cannot realistically be achieved without the other.340 
Third, helping low-capacity states necessarily requires federal assistance 
and motivating high-capacity states necessarily requires federal leverage. The 
federal government cannot get either for nothing. Both involve substantial 
additional money—enough to make the deal enticing for states. While Congress 
plausibly could demand more equity and adequacy from states pursuant to its 
congressional powers under the Fourteenth Amendment,341 such authority has 
not been substantiated by courts or even remotely recognized by politicians. This 
leaves Congress’s power under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. 
As spending legislation, Congress can only secure states’ consent to conditions 
in exchange for money.342 Congress and President Bush clearly understood this 
relationship in passing the NCLB, as the NCLB drastically expanded the federal 
role in education but only in exchange for a major increase in federal funding.343 
                                                 
 336. The effort Mississippi exerts to fund education is relatively high, but because of the state’s 
poverty, its funding level is still one of the lowest in the nation. Id. 
 337. Id. at 6–8, 24–25. 
 338. Goodwin Liu, Interstate Inequality in Educational Opportunity, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2044, 
2062–72 (2006). 
 339. Connecticut, Maryland, Illinois, and Pennsylvania are among the nation’s wealthiest states 
and biggest spenders on education, but they distribute their funds unequally among districts. BAKER ET 
AL., supra note 27, at 25. 
 340. Joshua E. Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. 477, 532–
42 (2014). 
 341. Black, supra note 2; Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 
YALE L.J. 330 (2006) (arguing that Congress can use its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to protect education as a right of national citizenship); Thomas A. Saenz, President and 
Gen. Counsel, Mex. Am. Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Keynote Address at the Univ. of Richmond Sch. 
of Law (Mar. 8, 2013), http://law.richmond.edu/about/events/rodriguez.html [https://perma.cc/M3P2-
ZKQ2]. 
 342. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (holding that statutory 
provisions granting Secretary of Health and Human Services the authority to penalize states choosing 
not to participate in Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s program expanding Medicaid 
exceeded Congress’s Spending Clause power); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding 
use of spending power where law directed Secretary of Transportation to withhold federal highway 
funds from states allowing persons under the age of twenty-one to lawfully purchase alcohol). 
 343. Benjamin Michael Superfine, Using the Courts to Influence the Implementation of No Child 
Left Behind, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 779, 790 (2006). 
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If Congress is to further equity and adequacy through the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act in the future, it must do the same again. 
The federal government has the capacity to make this investment with 
relatively little effort. The current outlays for the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act hover around $25 billion a year344—a miniscule number 
compared to the $938 billion in annual spending on health care.345 Federal 
spending on education altogether, which includes far more than just the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, is about 3 percent of the federal 
budget and is roughly equivalent to transportation or scientific research 
spending.346 In recent years, Congress has demonstrated the willingness to inject 
new funds into education to address short-term agendas. During the recession, 
Congress appropriated $4.3 billion to fund education innovation grants to 
states.347 Congress made an even bigger appropriation of $53.6 billion to cover 
the states’ budget shortfalls during the recession and to prevent massive teacher 
layoffs.348 Toward that end, Congress appropriated $53.6 billion with almost no 
strings attached.349 
An annual federal investment of $45 billion, rather than the current $15 
billion, would be enough to ensure that low-income students, particularly those 
attending schools with concentrated poverty, receive the additional funds they 
need.350 These federal funds alone, if properly targeted, would amount to a 20 
percent supplement for low-income students and would put states halfway to the 
                                                 
 344. NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE ACTION COMPARED TO ESSA 
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS, FY 2017 at 9 (2017), http://qa.nea.org/assets/docs/FY2017-
House-Appropriations-Committee-Bill-Compared-to-ESSA-Authorizations.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C4UD-CBLM] (totaling $24.5 billion in funding appropriations for the ESSA). 
 345. Policy Basics: Where Do Our Federal Tax Dollars Go?, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y 
PRIORITIES (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/policy-basics-where-do-our-
federal-tax-dollars-go [https://perma.cc/2327-KPNC]. 
 346. Id. 
 347. Benjamin Michael Superfine, Stimulating School Reform: The American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act and the Shifting Federal Role in Education, 76 MO. L. REV. 81, 101 (2011). 
 348. Id. at 106 (stating the stimulus package’s funds for education served “to plug budget holes 
and save jobs”). 
 349. Id. at 99. 
 350. In theory, Congress probably could cover half of the cost of a 40 percent bump to all low-
income students with $25 billion, but as the percentage of low-income students in a school increases, so 
will the necessary per-pupil expenditures. See generally Derek W. Black, The Congressional Failure to 
Enforce Equal Protection Through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 313, 
344–46 (2010). This Article proposes a $45 billion investment, which would account for the effects of 
concentrated poverty. The data for that estimate comes from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL SURVEY 
OF SCHOOL SYSTEM FINANCES: PER PUPIL AMOUNTS FOR CURRENT SPENDING OF PUBLIC 
ELEMENTARY-SECONDARY SCHOOL SYSTEMS BY STATE: FISCAL YEAR 2014, 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk 
[https://perma.cc/D7TE-7DUT]. The methodology and calculations were devised and performed by 
Professor Bruce D. Baker, Rutgers University Graduate School of Education. The data are on file with 
the author. 
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goal of a 40 percent supplement.351 This investment would afford the federal 
government the leverage to demand that states appropriately weight their funding 
formulas to meet the needs of disadvantaged students.352 At that point, existing 
and new Title I funds and state remediation could combine to provide a 40 
percent supplement for low-income students. Equally important, these federal 
funds would create the leverage and capacity the federal government needs for 
states to comply with the equity provisions outlined in the following sections. 
B. Adopt a Multi-Prong Approach to Achieving Equity 
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act should set strict equity 
requirements but offer states the ability to transition to full equity and the 
progressive funding outlined above over time. To immediately require absolute 
resource equality in the context of widespread and deep inequality would create 
circumstances like those that produced the NCLB waivers. The NCLB set 
unrealistic student achievement requirements and included no contingency plan 
to keep schools on track when they failed to meet them.353 Restructuring school 
funding is more realistic than moving all students to full proficiency, but as 
school finance litigation has shown, restructuring funding is far more politically 
challenging at the state and local levels.354 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1974 offers a compelling 
alternate model through which the federal government could consistently and 
progressively phase states toward equity. When Congress passed Title IX, 
females were formally excluded from certain educational institutions and 
systematically discriminated against in others.355 Over the past four decades, 
Title IX has eliminated most forms of sex-segregated education and has 
drastically closed opportunity gaps elsewhere.356 For example, in 1971, only 7 
                                                 
 351. State and local funds currently amount to roughly $550 billion. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STATISTICS, supra note 334. Half of the public school students are low-income. S. EDUC. FOUND., supra 
note 277. 
 352. By comparison, the Department of Education’s offer of $4.3 billion in Race to the Top funds 
was enough to motivate forty-six states to apply for the grants, and thirty-four to enact new laws to make 
them eligible to apply, including lifting caps on charter schools, moving toward the Common Core, and 
changing teacher evaluation systems. Race to the Top, WHITE HOUSE, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov//issues/education/k-12/race-to-the-top [https://perma.cc/4BBJ-
ZQWV]; see also William G. Howell, Results of President Obama’s Race to the Top, 15 ED. NEXT 58, 
62–66 (2015) (examining the causal nexus between the grant program and state policies). 
 353. The NCLB included a waiver provision, but that provision was not used to keep states and 
districts on course; it was used to leverage states into adopting an entirely new policy scheme. Black, 
supra note 137, at 613–16. 
 354. See generally Berry, supra note 233, at 213–15 (examining the actual effects, and lack 
thereof, of litigation on school funding). 
 355. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that Virginia’s categorical 
exclusion of women from Virginia Military Institute denied equal protection to women). 
 356. For an overview of Title IX’s developments over the years, see Paul M. Anderson, Title IX 
at Forty: An Introduction and Historical Review of Forty Legal Developments That Shaped Gender 
Equity Law, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 325 (2012). 
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percent of females participated in high school athletics.357 By 2007, more than 
40 percent were participating.358 This represents a 940 percent increase in the 
number of female athletes.359 
Title IX did not achieve these results by simply demanding absolute 
equality at the outset. Instead, Title IX has prompted progress in athletics through 
an interesting three-part standard. A school can demonstrate compliance with 
Title IX’s equal opportunity mandate by making one of three showings: (1) 
athletic opportunities for males and females are substantially proportionate to 
their enrollment numbers; (2) the school has a history and continuing practice of 
expanding opportunities for the underrepresented group, even though 
opportunities are not currently proportionate; or (3) “the interests and abilities of 
the members of [the underrepresented] sex have been fully and effectively 
accommodated by the present program.”360 The first prong is obviously 
demanding and almost no institutions can meet it, but the second and third prongs 
provide realistic standards to continually move schools toward the ultimate goal 
of equality.361 
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act could adopt an analogous 
multi-prong standard that sets fixed requirements of varying difficulty. The first 
prong would set an absolute requirement that states provide schools serving 
higher percentages of low-income students with the proportionately larger 
supplemental resources they require. This standard would apply both within and 
between school districts. Based on current data, not a single state in the nation 
would have consistently met this standard in recent years. Since 2010, only three 
states—Minnesota, Utah, and Ohio—have hit this mark more than once.362 At 
the other end of the spectrum, roughly half of the states fund high-need districts 
at lower levels than districts that are predominantly middle income and 
                                                 
 357. WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND., PLAY FAIR: A TITLE IX PLAYBOOK FOR VICTORY 4 (2009), 
https://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/play_fair_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5PAG-LYVC]. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. 
 360. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter, Intercollegiate Athletics 
Pol’y Clarification: The Three-Part Test—Part Three at 3 (Apr. 20, 2010); see also Cohen v. Brown 
University, 991 F.2d 888, 897–98 (1st Cir. 1993) (applying the three-part standard). 
 361. This approach is not without its critics. Ross A. Jurewitz, Playing at Even Strength: 
Reforming Title IX Enforcement in Intercollegiate Athletics, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 283, 
332–33 (2000); Michael Straubel, Gender Equity, College Sports, Title IX and Group Rights: A Coach’s 
View, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1039, 1041–42 (1996); Victoria Langton, Comment, Stop the Bleeding: Title 
IX and the Disappearance of Men’s Collegiate Athletic Teams, 12 VANDERBILT J. ENT. & TECH. L. 181 
(2009). 
 362. BAKER ET AL., supra note 27, at 25 tbl.B-2 (6th ed. Jan. 2017). Most scholars estimate that 
low-income students require 40 percent or more in additional funding than middle-income students. See, 
e.g., Wiener & Pristoop, supra note 31, at 5, 6 (stating that Goodwin Liu uses a 60 percent adjustment 
for poor children, while authors Wiener and Pristoop use a 40 percent adjustment). No state—not even 
Minnesota, Ohio, or Utah—would have met that standard. Rather, they hit a more moderate benchmark 
of 25 percent additional funding for higher-need school districts. BAKER ET AL., supra note 363, at 25. 
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wealthy.363 A requirement that states fund schools serving larger percentages of 
low-income students at proportionately higher levels would set a goal that is 
within the immediate reach of only a few states. 
The second equality prong could provide the remaining states interim relief 
while still pushing them to make progress. Like Title IX’s progress standard, 
states and districts with a history and continuing practice of closing funding gaps 
and moving toward the required supplemental funding for high-need schools 
would be exempted from the absolute equality requirement. The exact amount 
of progress necessary to comply each year could be set at any number of levels 
but, at the very least, should demand that states currently funding low-income 
districts at levels lower than other districts eliminate those gaps within five 
years.364 Once a state eliminates this raw funding gap, prong two might require 
that states demonstrate at least a 2 percent increase in funding for high-need 
districts relative to other districts each year. Under this standard, a state doing 
the bare minimum would still have twenty years to meet the absolute requirement 
of prong one but like under Title IX, the state would have a clear and realistic 
path to reaching the equality goal. 
The concept of resource equality, like that of proportional athletic 
participation by gender, will prove controversial. Some states, districts, and 
policymakers will contest money’s relevance to educational opportunity and the 
precise goal of prong one.365 To address these concerns, a third prong could 
provide an entirely distinct metric of equality: one based on academic 
achievement. States and districts would be allowed to demonstrate that, 
regardless of the resources low-income students receive, their low-income 
students achieve at levels reasonably representative of equal educational 
opportunity. A state or district could make this showing if their low-income 
students meet one of two benchmarks: (1) achieve at a level equal to or above 
the national average for low-income students, or (2) make one year’s worth of 
academic progress during the past school year. Both of these showings would be 
based on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), the national 
benchmark for academic achievement.366 
This third prong would serve several important ends without repeating the 
past mistakes of the NCLB and prior versions of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act. First, it concedes that while resources are the primary criterion 
of educational opportunity, resources are not an infallible measure. In some 
                                                 
 363. BAKER ET AL., supra note 363, at 25. 
 364. Twenty-three states currently fall in this category. Id. 
 365. See, e.g., Eric Hanushek, When School Finance “Reform” May Not Be Good Policy, 28 
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 366. See generally LYLE V. JONES & INGRAM OLKIN, THE NATION’S REPORT CARD: 
EVOLUTIONS AND PERSPECTIVES (2004) (explaining that NAEP is the “gold standard” in measuring 
student achievement). 
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circumstances, other measures may be more valid. Local variations and the 
numerous soft and hard variables that interact with resources may make 
resources less important than they otherwise would be.367 When states and 
districts can point to another relatively reliable indicator of equal educational 
opportunity, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act will respect it. This 
is analogous to Title IX’s “accommodation of interest standard,” which concedes 
that some women may be less interested than men in sports and that meeting 
students’ interests can be sufficient.368 
A prong directed at student achievement provides some level of continuity 
with prior federal policy but would work far differently than the NCLB’s or the 
ESSA’s. On the one hand, this third prong would maintain the relevance of tests, 
their potentially conclusive effect, and the important role the play in research and 
data analysis. On the other hand, relying on NAEP scores would eliminate the 
possibility of local variation and the incentive to manipulate state tests, both of 
which can render test results meaningless.369 Similarly, benchmarking low-
income students’ performance against a national average or a year’s worth of 
progress would eliminate unrealistic achievement goals like those found in the 
NCLB. Instead, these benchmarks would take into account the fact that low-
income students are not similarly situated to other students.370 
However, a standard that compares low-income students to each other 
could be construed as setting low expectations for low-income students.371 In 
practice, it would be quite the opposite. With the first two equality prongs driving 
up educational opportunity for low-income students nationally, those students’ 
achievement should increase as well.372 Thus, states and districts that seek to 
demonstrate compliance through student achievement will be comparing their 
students’ test scores with those of low-income students whom we would expect 
to achieve at higher levels. Comparative analysis of this sort eliminates 
subjective judgments about proficiency373 and instead uses a real-world measure 
                                                 
 367. See, e.g., Murnane, supra note 366. 
 368. See Jurewitz, supra note 362, at 332–33; Straubel, supra note 362, at 1041–42. 
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of the achievement that results when low-income students are afforded 
appropriate supplemental resources. 
More concerning is the possibility that too many states and districts would 
opt for third-prong compliance, thereby minimizing the aforementioned upward 
effects of comparative analysis across states. However, the states and districts 
that would find this prong most attractive are those whose low-income students 
are already performing above average.374 Those with below-average 
achievement would still be forced to improve either their achievement or their 
resource equity, and improvement on either metric would presumably drive up 
average national achievement. In turn, this would incentivize states to “race to 
the top” in student achievement or, when unsuccessful, strive toward resource 
equity under the first two prongs. 
While aggressive, this three-prong approach would also minimize the 
perception that the federal government is treating states and local authorities 
unfairly. States and districts that fail to meet any of the prongs would not be 
sympathetic victims of federal intrusion.375 To the contrary, they would be prime 
examples of states and districts that warrant reprimand. They would have 
continued to underfinance their schools and produce poor student outcomes 
despite receiving significant federal funding. They could not claim that they 
distributed federal funds fairly and it simply did not work. Nor could they claim 
that their students were performing well notwithstanding resources. 
In sum, this three-pronged approach to equity manages a careful balance 
among competing views and practical limitations. It keeps absolute resource 
equality at the forefront, but recognizes that achieving it requires a mutually 
reinforcing set of interim progress measures. Equally important, it labels states 
and districts—not the federal government—as the villain upon failure to comply 
with its standards. 
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exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority because possession of a gun in a local school zone 
was not an economic activity substantially affecting interstate commerce and noting that states retain 
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from the Unconstitutional Coercion of No Child Left Behind, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 725 (2008). 
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C. Set Aside Funds for Prekindergarten Education 
The federal government should make a short-term but substantial 
investment in prekindergarten education for disadvantaged students. If the 
purpose of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act is to ensure 
supplemental educational opportunities for disadvantaged students, social 
science uniformly indicates that there is no better supplemental opportunity than 
prekindergarten education.376 As James Ryan wrote: 
In the short and medium term, researchers [have] found enhanced 
academic achievement, a reduction in special education placements, and 
reduced grade repetition. Over the long term, benefits [have] included a 
greater likelihood of graduating high school and attending college, 
better employment and higher wages, lower crime rates, and decreased 
welfare dependency.377 
With findings so compelling, political support for prekindergarten 
education is widespread. Since 2013, the Department of Education has put its 
full support behind expanding prekindergarten.378 Congress itself included $250 
million in annual funding for prekindergarten in the ESSA.379 Law enforcement 
has also endorsed spending more money on prekindergarten, recognizing it as 
the most cost-effective way to reduce juvenile justice contacts, incarceration, and 
social services costs.380 Even hedge funds and money managers have invested in 
public prekindergarten education on the condition that they will share in the 
savings that public schools reap in subsequent years through reduced special 
education and support-service needs.381 
Notwithstanding this support, relatively few students have access to public 
preschool education. Nationally, only 29 percent of four-years-olds are enrolled 
                                                 
 376. Ryan, supra note 35, at 52 (noting that “researchers have uniformly demonstrated [that] the 
benefits of preschool . . . easily . . . outweigh the costs”). 
 377. Id. at 66. 
 378. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP—EARLY LEARNING CHALLENGE, FY 
2013 COMPETITION, GUIDANCE, AND FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS FOR APPLICANTS (2013); 
Duncan, supra note 193. 
 379. Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), Pub. L. No. 114-95, § 9212(k), 129 Stat. 1802 (2015). 
 380. FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS, I’M THE GUY YOU PAY LATER 6 (2013) (noting that one 
analysis found that prekindergarten produces a net societal gain of $15,000 per student due to lower 
social service costs and additional tax revenues later in life). 
 381. See, e.g., William Alden, Goldman Sachs to Finance Early Education Program, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 12, 2013), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/goldman-to-invest-in-utah-preschool-
program [https://perma.cc/VMU5-CRAL]; Sean Meehan, Pre-K Program Attracts Investors Out for 
Returns, EDUC. WK. (Aug. 6, 2013), 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2013/08/07/37preschool_ep.h32.html [https://perma.cc/65GA-
HG64]; see also Art Rolnick & Rob Grunewald, Early Childhood Development: Economic 
Development with a High Public Return, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (Mar. 1, 2003), 
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/fedgazette/early-childhood-development-economic-
development-with-a-high-public-return [https://perma.cc/35TA-UDRS] (detailing the Minnesota 
Federal Reserve’s conclusion that preschool education was a better public investment than sports 
stadiums or business subsidies). 
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in public state preschool382 and only 5 percent of three-year-olds have access.383 
Those numbers have been essentially flat for the past five years.384 Only Vermont 
and the District of Columbia serve more than half of their three- and four-year-
olds.385 Twenty-four states serve fewer than 10 percent; eight of those states 
serve none.386 This is to say nothing of the funding and quality problems in the 
preschool programs that exist. Per-pupil spending for preschool is regularly half 
of that for elementary and secondary education,387 which creates a number of 
problems with staff quality and training, curricula, and instruction.388 
James Ryan estimated that the full cost of providing universal, high-quality 
preschool education would be approximately $8,000 per child and $60 billion in 
total.389 The cost of providing preschool to just low-income students would be 
closer to $30 billion390—a number representing about 5 percent of the national 
expenditures in kindergarten through twelfth grade.391 States, with the aid of 
various sources, currently spend approximately $6 billion on preschool.392 
The ESSA’s $250 million annual investment does not come close to 
creating the leverage necessary to close this gap,393 but an additional $10 billion 
could. In comparison to the $14 billion in current federal Title I outlays and the 
nearly $12 billion in federal special education funding,394 this number is 
relatively small. Moreover, it is only 25 percent more than the $7.7 billion 
                                                 
 382. NAT’L INST. FOR EARLY EDUC. RES., supra note 34, at 6. To be clear, the above-the-line 
statements reference only state preschool education. States do enroll substantial numbers of students in 
special education preschool programs, and private institutions and the federal Head Start program serve 
a number of other students. Id. at 16 tbl.4. 
 383. Id. at 6. 
 384. Id. (revealing a 1 percent increase). 
 385. Id. at 14 tbl.2. 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. at 10. 
 388. Id. at 17 tbl.5 (charting the benchmark standards that each state meets and does not meet); 
Dale C. Farran & Mark W. Lipsey, Expectations of Sustained Effects from Scaled up Pre-K: Challenges 
from the Tennessee Study, EVIDENCE SPEAKS REP., Oct. 8, 2015, at 1–3 (finding implementation and 
quality problems in Tennessee’s new preschool program). 
 389. Ryan, supra note 35, at 67–68. 
 390. This estimate is based on recent data showing that as of 2013, 51 percent of public school 
students are low income. S. EDUC. FOUND., supra note 277. 
 391. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 334. 
 392. NAT’L INST. FOR EARLY EDUC. RES., supra note 34, at 6. 
 393. See, e.g., The Conversation, Why Every Student Succeeds Act Still Leaves Most Vulnerable 
Kids Behind, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015-12-14/why-
every-student-succeeds-act-still-leaves-most-vulnerable-kids-behind [https://perma.cc/VM66-9CDH]. 
 394. CLAIRE MCCANN, NEW AM., FEDERAL FUNDING FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES: THE 
EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL SPECIAL EDUCATION FINANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 11 fig.8 (2014). 
1372 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  105:1309 
currently spent on federal Head Start programs395—some of which could be used 
to fund high-quality preschool instead.396 
A temporary $10 billion federal investment would put states halfway 
toward the full cost of quality preschool for low-income students and would also 
play a powerful role in serving the Elementary and Secondary Education Act’s 
other long-term goals. The federal financial stake in preschool and education in 
general could easily shrink over time. While the initial costs of preschool are 
high, students who attend preschool cost society far less in later years. Even the 
most conservative studies find that the public savings derived from preschool are 
more than twice its cost.397 States could easily use those savings to fund a larger 
portion of preschool in future years and to ease the costs of meeting the equity 
requirements outlined above. In short, a major federal investment in preschool 
would have positive reciprocal effects on state education finances that make 
compliance with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act far easier than 
had the federal government done nothing. 
CONCLUSION 
After a decade and a half of incessant standardized testing, harsh 
punishments, and unexpected federal dictates, the education pendulum swung 
entirely in the opposite direction at the end of 2015. In the process, it eviscerated 
much of the good that the Elementary and Secondary Education Act had 
guaranteed for the past half century. Federal leadership on closing achievement 
gaps and ensuring equal and adequate resources is gone. Yet, despite all that was 
lost so quickly, there is reason to believe the setback may only be temporary. 
A unique confluence of events led to this massive shift: the NCLB had 
become one of the most reviled pieces of education legislation in decades; its 
reauthorization or amendment was nearly a decade overdue; in that interim, the 
Secretary of Education Arne Duncan had far exceeded his authority in placing 
new conditions on states in exchange for NCLB waivers, making a new 
extension of the Department’s power disconcerting to most; those waiver 
conditions included a nationalized Common Core curriculum and new teacher 
evaluation systems, both of which generated significant backlash; and finally, 
Congress was desperately in need of a legislative victory after six years of nearly 
                                                 
 395. HEAD START, HEAD START PROGRAM FACTS FISCAL YEAR 2013 at 10 (2013), 
https://eclkc.ohs.acf.hhs.gov/hslc/data/factsheets/docs/hs-program-fact-sheet-2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2N2Y-AURP] (indicating $7,573,095,000 in federal Head Start funding in fiscal year 
2013). 
 396. The competitive forces that Head Start creates in the labor market have presented problems 
for public preschool programs, which makes collapsing these funds even more compelling. See Abbott 
v. Burke, 790 A.2d 842, 852–54 (N.J. 2002) (holding that Department of Education must “supplement 
existing Head Start funding with state funding sufficient to allow Head Start to meet state standards and 
to retain certified teachers”). 
 397. LYNN A. KAROLY, RAND, INVESTING IN OUR CHILDREN 91–98 (1998); see also Ryan, 
supra note 35, at 65–69 (surveying the literature on the positive benefits of preschool education). 
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none. The ESSA was the lowest common denominator to solve all of these 
problems, even if it solved none for student achievement and equality. 
Some in Congress surely recognized that the ESSA was a train that could 
not be stopped, but one that could be tolerated for a few years. From this 
perspective, the fact that the ESSA was authorized for only four years makes 
sense. Congress will necessarily have the opportunity to reconsider it more 
quickly than many Elementary and Secondary Education Act reauthorizations of 
the past. The vast discretion afforded to states in the interim also comes with an 
ironic silver lining. Insofar as the ESSA does not require states to implement an 
entirely new approach to education—as did the NCLB and its subsequent waiver 
conditions—scrapping it in a few years can be done with little cost. Thus, as 
flawed as the ESSA is, some in Congress could have intended it as a means to 
defer the political and practical turmoil of a new equality regime until 
meaningful change is practicable. 
At that point, Congress must substantially increase federal funding for 
education to secure states’ consent to strict new equity standards and to meet the 
outstanding needs of low-income students. Additional federal funding can also 
finally make preschool for low-income students a reality and close achievement 
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